Monthly Archives: July 2013

Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris

As an Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, Mr. Grunstein represented the City in Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Harris in 1977/1978. In 1975, Trinity Episcopal School Corporation and Trinity Housing Company, Inc. sought to stop construction of a housing project planned for the West Side Urban Renewal Area (the blocks between West 87th and West 97th from Amsterdam Avenue to Central Park West).

There were four issues in question: (1) whether the defendants had breached their contract with Trinity; (2) whether the defendants had failed to conform with the purposes and intent of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan; (3) whether the concentration of low-income housing in Trinity’s immediate area would create an nonintegrated “pocket ghetto;” and (4) whether HUD had complied with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

Following three years of litigation, Judge Irving Ben Cooper of the Southern District Court of New York determined that the City and HUD had fulfilled their duties and dismissed Trinity’s complaint in January of 1978.

Interest, Ribit and Riba

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

PART I

PART II

PART III

PART IV

PART V

PART VI

PART VII

PART VIII

PART IX

PART X

PART XI

PART XII

PART XIII

PART XIV

PART XV

PART XVI

PART XVII

Morris Grunstein Biography

Morris Grunstein

Morris Grunstein

Born around 1926 in Pilicia, a town in Poland, Morris Grunstein, a scion of the illustrious Yonason Eybeshitz family, was sent to a Nazi labor camp in 1940 and managed to escape four years later during the death march to Germany. Weighing only 60 pounds, he traveled to Italy, where he recuperated and studied to be an electrician. In 1950, he moved to Milwaukee WI, where he eventually married and started a family. Initially working at a foundry, he found a job as a master electrician in Westinghouse and rose quickly through the ranks. He gave up his chosen profession as an electrician to move his family to New York in 1958, settling in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Crown Heights, in order to provide his children with greater opportunities.

After some time in New York, he decided to move the family to Queens, eventually owning and operating supermarkets in Laurelton and Forest Hills, which he converted to kosher emporiums that were closed on the Sabbath. One of his stores, Good Food in Laurelton, appears in a history book on several neighborhoods in Queens.

Morris Grunstein Storefront

Morris Grunstein Storefront – Good Food in Laurelton

Morris Grunstein Store Inside "Good Food"

Morris Grunstein Store – Inside “Good Food” in Laurelton

A wise, confident, religious and worldly individual, he instilled an undeniable desire to excel in all his children: Nettie attended Bet Yaakov High on a full academic scholarship, while Harry went to BMT in Israel and graduated magna cum laude from Queens College, eventually earning a combination MPA/MPH at Columbia. Three of his many grandchildren, are equally, if not more, impressive: a gifted surgeon, a dentist and a doctor in clinical psychology. All those years ago, he made the choice to move halfway across the country, sacrificing his own aspirations for those of his kids in order to make sure they could have the opportunity to succeed.

Mr. Grunstein suffered from Parkinson’s for several years, and passed on in 1995, but left an indelible legacy of hard work, love and faith.

Morris Grunstein

Morris Grunstein

Solution & Conclusion | IRR Part XVII

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

PROPOSED SOLUTION & CONCLUSION

As noted above, the concept of trying to meet the requirements of the capital markets the needs of the capital markets and the conflicting needs of the Sha’ariah or Halacha as the case may be, within a unitary structure is problematical. Embedding the documents favored by one structure within another only seems to cause more problems; not solve them. It is suggested that the key is to apply a more nuanced approach.

Underlying this approach is a recognition that when documents are entered into under one system of law and ethics and enforcement is sought under another contradictory system of laws and ethics, problems can and do arise.  Each system is better able to deal with its own laws and traditions and to overcome the problems they face.

Melding the competing systems creates a situation where anomalous and unpredictable results can occur.  As demonstrated with respect to the Heter Iska, precisely the wrong result was obtained in a New York lower court case, as noted above, from that which was intended under the Halacha.  There also appears to be genuine resistance in the US to enabling religious orientated forms and usages that conflict with established business norms.  This kind of push back is to be expected even in the healthiest of diverse societies, when the implicit message is, in effect, my system is morally superior to yours.  As I hope is demonstrated above, these concerns are borne more of ignorance and misperception than as a result of genuine differences.  I do believe that resolution of these issues does not lie in integrating these discordant systems of law and practice.  Rather, it is suggested the solution lies in a healthy respect of each system for the other and self-respect, as well.

Why not therefore allow each system to exist and develop on its own.  As discussed above the concept of embedding hybrid loan documents in a Sha’ariah complaint structure does not cure the problem. Indeed it would appear to cause more problems than it solves.

It is suggested that one way of accomplishing this result is to enter into Halachic or Sha’ariah compliant documents in a manner that is enforceable under the respective religious laws that created them; but, which do not require enforcement under US law, as more fully discussed below. Similarly, a separate capital markets compliant structure and set of documents would be entered into that is enforceable under US law.

In the case of Heter Iska, I have accomplished this by having the document executed in a manner, which makes it enforceable under the Halacha, but, which absolutely makes it unenforceable under US Law.  As noted above, the Heter Iska need not be enforceable under US Law to make it effective, Halachically.  The fact that the Heter Iska is or is not enforceable under US law is wholly irrelevant.  It only has to be enforceable in a Bet Din under the Halacha.  This is accomplished through the simple device of the parties themselves not signing the document.       It is also recommend that another clause be added as well.  The clause would provide that the Heter Iska could only be enforced in a Bat Din and not in any other forum; and then only in accordance with the Halacha.

In the case of the Shariah, I am relying on the Hanifa Fatwa and its progeny that permit loans on interest in a non-Islamic state, as more fully discussed above. I am also relying on the Tantawi Fatwa and to a lesser extent the Quaradawi Fatwa. As also noted below, the loan structure is non-recourse. Thus, not only is there no individual borrower or lender (both are entities), the borrower generally has no personal liability. The only qualification is that the borrower not interfere with the enforcement of the loan or violate certain covenants intended to preserve bankruptcy remoteness and the integrity of the collateral. This is often referred to as a “good guy guarantee”.

In this regard I can’t help but note that it is the lender that is taking real risks in furnishing the credit to the borrower. Indeed as between the lender and borrower, it is the lender who is taking most of the risk. If anything, the price, in terms of interest rate charged to the borrower, is most beneficial to the borrower. After all the lender is putting up most of the money to accomplish the transaction. When you look through the transaction, it is in substance the pre-fixing of return by the lender. Most borrowers don’t want the lender to be their partner in the upside. Hence they prefer to borrow as much money as possible at a fixed rate of return. Under this structure, the borrower is not personally liable on the downside. It is the assets forming the collateral package that stand for the loan.  The key to this structure, which benefits the borrower, is to satisfy the requirements of the capital markets without qualification.

Thus, it is proposed that there be a wholly capital complaint structure that fully and unequivocally satisfies the requirements of the capital market. In addition, there would be a wholly Sha’ariah compliant structure created which is separate and apart from the capital compliant structure and which does not interfere with it. The Sha’ariah compliant structure would also not require enforcement under US law.  This could be accomplished by isolating the religious oriented financing transaction from the loan transaction format. The loan transaction format would be formulated to best take advantage of the opportunities for placement through the capital markets. The Sha’ariah compliant format would similarly be structured separately to fully comply with the requirements of the Sha’ariah. This separation could be accomplished as follows:

  1. A US lending company could be formed.  It could be an actual bank or public or private lending platform.  If not a bank then a public or private lending REIT might be a useful lending entity.  This is because it is a recognized form in the marketplace and it offers tax advantages, like pass though of taxable income (i.e., no double taxation).  This is particularly useful for a foreign investor that is otherwise not taxable in the US or receives other tax concessions under certain treaties (depending on the country of origin of the ultimate lender).
  2.  The US lending company would be staffed with expert personnel who are able to originate, underwrite and process loan transactions through the capital markets.
  3. The US lending company would be capitalized in a Sha’ariah compliant manner using financing mechanisms along the lines suggested above.
  4. This kind of structure could be used for each financing transaction or as an ongoing business format.
  5. The Sha’ariah compliant capitalization of the US lending company could be made subject to binding arbitration under the Sha’ariah.  The documentation for this kind of remedy is readily available.  It has been used successfully in the analogous circumstances of a Bet Din under the Halacha and has been found to be enforceable under NY law,[1] if properly drafted, executed and effectuated in practice.
  6. The loan transaction would take the form of a typical capital markets loan transaction.  It would include a note, first mortgage, assignment of the rents and all of the special purpose entities and bankruptcy remoteness demanded by the capital markets, as the threshold requirement of accessing the favorable rates and terms achievable in this context.  As is typical, US law would govern and the documents would be enforceable in the US courts, exclusively.
  7. There would be strict separation between the Sha’ariah compliant source of funding and the Sha’ariah compliant documents and the actual lending entity and loan documents with the ultimate borrower.  If appropriate under the Sha’ariah, the US lending entity need not be run day to day by the Sha’ariah compliant capital source.  This so as not to run afoul of any rules that prohibit this kind of direct involvement under the Sha’ariah.
  8. The structure would provide that, aside from a so-called good guy guarantee, the loan would be non-recourse. This would prevent the occurrence of one of the most fundamental reasons for the prohibition against Riba. As Timur Kuran notes[2], the term Riba is derived from the word “Rib. According to Kuran the term Rib means the construct in the Koran[3] that describes how the lender abused the borrower by doubling or quadrupling the loan amount as a condition of the extension of a loan that had become due. This is the essence of Riba according to Kuran. He distinguishes this from ordinary interest. He goes on to say that the wrong that the Koran sought to interdict was what happened next. The debtor couldn’t repay the loan with so usurious a rate and was forced to lose all his property to the extortionate creditor and become a slave.  While, as noted above, modern US debtor-creditor laws and bankruptcy laws are designed to prevent just this kind of a condition (and there is no such thing as debtors’ prison in the US,) nevertheless the dangers of penury were sought to be avoided by this measure against the imposition of Riba.

It is suggested that this kind of structure[4], is permitted by the Hanafi Fatwa in the US, because it is not an Islamic state where Sha’ariah law governs. Furthermore, the typical lender, whether a bank or otherwise, is generally an entity (i.e.: a legal person) not an individual. Thus whether it is the Tantawi Fatwa or previous Fatwas dealing with Cash Waqf’s or the progeny of the Tantawi Fatwa, where under banks are allowed to pay and receive interest, there is a sound legal basis under the Sha’ariah to permit this solution. On the other hand, there are many who would object and argue that this structure nevertheless yields prohibited Riba. Be that as it may, I offer this as a proposed structure for those who might embrace it, for all the reasons discussed in this article.

It is suggested that using this kind of a structure can achieved the goals of all parties concerned.  The capital source is able to follow their religious principles without having to be concerned that somehow a US court might undo what was intended.  The borrower receives the benefit of more favorable rates and terms than would otherwise be the case.  Concomitantly, all of the terms and conditions of the capital markets, that were designed so as to afford so favorable an execution will continue to take precedence under US law, without religious complication or entanglement.  The result is the kind of predictability that each system of law intended, before they became entangled.  I can’t help but note the wisdom of our founding fathers in seeking to prevent this very kind of entanglement.


[1] See CPLR Article 75. See also The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Bet Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, by Ginnie Fried, in the Fordham Urban Law Journal (Volume 31, Issue 2, Article 8: page 644, et seq.-2003).  See also Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders by Michael A. Helfand (NYU Law Review 86-2011); and Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct by Michael A. Helfand (George Mason Law Review 19-2011).

[2] In the Logic of Financial Westernization in the Middle East, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol.56 (2005) at page 595.

[3] Ibid. See Koran 2:274-80, 3:130 and 4:160-61 as cited by Kuran

[4] Already implicit in the more modern Sukuk financing product described in Section XIV above.

Disconnect Between Riba Theory & Practice, Concerns About Separation of Church & State in US | IRR Part XVI

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN RIBA IN THEORY UNDER THE SHA’ARIAH AND IN PRACTICE

As Dr. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal[1] pointed out in his most insightful article “Incoherence of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in the Age of Financial Engineering”[2] (May 2007), there is a disconnect between the goals of Islam and the methodology chosen to avoid the strictures against Riba.

I would suggest, as noted above, there is also a disconnect between the artificial contract forms and structures used and how they might be interpreted under US law as compared to what they were intended to accomplish.

Furthermore, Dr. El Gamal notes that even when the capital markets have dealt with Sha’ariah compliant financial products (embodying equity like legal structures, so different from the loan products they are intended to mimic), they cost more than the equivalent loan product.  It is submitted that if these religious oriented financial products were actually fully tested in the US courts and the courts properly interpreted the text of these legal documents, it is likely that there would even be a greater pricing disparity.  Indeed, for good reason; because the legal structures are based on re-characterizing a loan as equity, with all of the attendant risks, including, intervening creditors, claims of lack of priority and difficulty of enforcement associated with such products.  These deficiencies usually result in pricing disparities.  Moreover, it is unclear whether there even is a summary enforcement remedy of foreclosure, which is also fundamental to the pricing of a loan product.  Frankly, it is likely that the very nature of the documents is open to question.  After all, it is not supposed to be a loan; or is it?

The response of the English courts is cogent.  They found that it’s not their business.  They chose instead to deal with the note itself and not the overlay of Sha’ariah compliant legal structures and the documents; and, as noted herein, well they should.  This is because the enforcement of these structures is fraught with all manner of legal difficulty for all the reasons noted herein and likely others as well.

This kind of analysis echoes the views of Rabbi Epstein in his work the Tosefot Bracha[3] noted above.  He noted the success of the banking function in promoting commerce and prosperity and yet it appeared to be prohibited Biblically.  There was a disconnect.  How could something so good, be so wrong?  His answer was cogent.  He found that the new world of commerce and finance was to be embraced and that this was indeed what the Talmud was suggesting, thousands of years before.  Whether it is the original Iska (part loan and part investment trust) structure or its further development in the Heter Iska, the Halacha  is not fixed; it is vibrant.  It developed mechanisms to meet the needs of the real world and market place.  Similarly the Sha’ariah and the mechanisms described above that are Sha’ariah compliant.

Nevertheless, to be fair, it requires some further practical changes, because nefarious debtors have sought to misuse the US courts to defeat their obligations.  However, if properly employed in the religious setting, only, as intended, then it serves a vital function.

In the case of a Heter Iska, ordinary loan documents can be signed and, as noted below, a separate instrument (whether on the wall and unsigned or signed only by witnesses and not the parties), resolves any religious concerns about Ribit.  This while not upsetting the requirements of the capital markets and US law.  Hence, religious matters are dealt with in a way amenable to religious authorities and the wonderful benefits offered by the capital markets are embraced.  As noted below, this kind of approach, in practice, may provide a useful solution as to how to deal with similar Sha’ariah law concerns.

Dr. El-Gamal also notes that the higher cost of the Sh’ariah compliant version of a financing, as compared to an ordinary loan, is also of concern.[4] Ideally, this should be a focus of Islamic jurists and mitigate against a wholesale rejection of the benefits of the capital markets approach under US law.  Why not find a way to accept these lower cost formats on some expedient basis? Thus, Dr. El-Gamal points out the focus on “contract forms” as a means of purporting to provide financial products and services in accordance with Islamic law or Sha’ariah may in fact be misguided.  In essence, instead of extending a mortgage loan on most favorable terms and rates, the Sha’ariah banks are purporting to buy the property first and then re-sell it to the customer in a credit priced transaction where the borrower still pays on the basis of a benchmarked implicit rate of return on capital comparable to (but higher than) prevailing mortgage rates.  He points out that this, therefore, should be viewed as fundamentally adverse to the interests of the Sha’ariah in protecting borrowers.  Why engage in this kind of exercise if the result is to hurt and not benefit borrowers? As noted above, the structures become very complicated and with each level of complication there are added concerns about enforceability and additional costs and pricing.  Moreover, ultimately, the whole structure appears to be a ruse.  There are other structures not discussed in this article that add even more additional layers of structure but the common theme is that ultimately it is all just a mechanism.  At its heart, it is just an analogue; a means by which a loan with interest is derived.  The form takes precedence over the substance.  Is this what religion has come to stand for? Do it one way, as a matter of form, and it’s OK and, yet do the very same thing in substance, using another form and it’s not.

The incoherence that Dr. El-Gamal speaks of has many different layers of application.  Frankly, as noted at the beginning of this article, the objects of each system may be the same, to facilitate the movement of capital from those with a surplus to those in need.  The methodology chosen may not always perform as intended, especially when the structure is subjected to the laws of another system.  Hence, there is further incoherence, as it were.

The solution may lie in the concepts expressed below.  Instead of forcing one religion’s internal solutions on another conflicting legal system, it may be more effective to minimize the intrusion.  Why not adopt the best each system has to offer and do so in a manner that limits interference or entanglement.  Set forth below is a possible solution.

 

BLOWBACK BECAUSE OF REAL LIFE CONCERNS ABOUT SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN THE US

There are reportedly initiatives underway in at least 7 States and reportedly as many as 22,[5] to ban the use of Sha’ariah in their State courts.

Bill Mears of CNN in discussing the matter,[6] reports that this is in reaction to a most disturbing case in New Jersey.  It would appear that  a lower court judge refused to grant a restraining order against a Muslim husband who was accused by his wife of forcing her to have sex with him.  The husband defended himself against the charge of rape by asserting he was just exercising his right as a husband under Islamic law to have marital relations when he so desired.  Thus, he was acting in accordance with his religious beliefs, albeit wholly inconsistent with US law that viewed his actions as nothing more than rape.  Fortunately, the New Jersey Appeals Court[7] intervened and overturned the lower court’s decision to deny the wife the protection of a restraining order.  The New Jersey Appeals Court found that the case “presents a conflict between the criminal law and religious precepts.”[8]  The Appeals Court went on to say “In resolving this conflict, the judge determined to exempt (the husband) from the operation of the State’s statutes as the result of his religious beliefs.  In doing so, the judge was mistaken.”[9]

Earlier this year, a Florida Senate panel approved an anti-Sha’ariah bill.  Scott Keys[10] reported that the panel deliberated for 3 minutes.  The bill had already been passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  A concurrent bill was also to be voted on in the Florida House.  The proposed legislation would ban the use of foreign laws like the Sha’ariah in Florida courts.

A similar ban was on the ballot in Oklahoma to amend the State Constitution.  The initiative was preliminarily enjoined by the Federal Court of Appeals in the 10th Circuit.[11] Under the Oklahoma version, the State Constitution was to have been amended to mandate its State courts to apply only US law and not International law like the Sha’ariah.[12]  Legislators in Louisiana, South Carolina, Utah, Tennessee, Texas and many other States are undertaking similar legislative initiatives.

There are in fact conflicts between Western law and traditions and other systems of law like the Sha’ariah.  They cannot be readily integrated.  The differences are striking and irreconcilable.  My own view is there is no reason to meld these conflicting systems of law and ethics.  Rather, they can and should continue to exist side by side, as discussed in this article.


[1] A noted Islamic scholar who is the Chair of the Islamic Economics, Finance and Management and Professor of Economics at Rice University.

[2] Supra footnote 176. See also supra footnote 179.

[3] Supra footnote 42

[4] See also Handbook of Islamic Banking, page 94, which notes that Islamic banks in England are more expensive more than conventional banks for the same types of credits. The Handbook is edited by M. Kabir Hassan and Mervyn K. Lewis.  It is published by Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. of the UK and Northampton, Mass. in the US. It may be referenced on the Internet as well.  See also “Interest and the Paradox of contemporary Islamic Law and Finance” by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal of Rice University; Losing Interest:  Financial Alchemy in Islamic, Talmudic and Western Law by Michael H. Lubetsky; Islamic and Jewish Perspectives on Interest by Joel S. Newman (89 Tax Notes 1311-12/4/2000); Contemporary Practices of Islamic Financing Techniques by Dr. Ansaf Ahmad (1993); and Issues in Islamic Banking by Mahammad Ne Jatillah Siddiquim; The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, London UK (1983/140314 at page 152).

[5] See Report by Scott Keys in ThinkProgress.org on February 29, 2012; Report by Donna Leinwand of USA Today on 12/9/2010; and Report by Bill Mears of CNN on 11/29/2010.

[6] Ibid

[7] S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super 417, 2 A.3d 412 (2010).

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Supra footnote 190

[11] Awad v. Ziriax  (Federal Court of Appeals-10th Circuit Index # 10-6273-Jan. 10, 2012).

[12] See Op Ed by Michael A. Helfand “A Law We Don’t Need” – LA Times (November 10, 2010).