Tag Archives: Riba

Leonard Grunstein Gives Lecture at Yeshivat Sha’alvim

Leonard Grunstein recently gave a lecture at Yeshivat Sha’alvim on religious law and interest. Opening remarks were given by Rav Yechezkel Yakovson and Rabbi Asher Weiss, respected teachers and thinkers within the community. Grunstein’s lecture revolved around his article titled, “Interest, Ribit and Riba,” which was published in The Banking Law Journal in 2013. The article analyzes Sharia finance, and proposes a way to reconcile capitalist and Islamic financial markets. The full text of his article can be found here, and the lecture can be viewed in its entirety by following the link below:

http://new.livestream.com/accounts/665286/shaalvim?utm_source=Grunstein+Event_Feb+2015&utm_campaign=grunstein+1&utm_medium=email

The conference program can be found, here.

Interest, Ribit and Riba

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

PART I

PART II

PART III

PART IV

PART V

PART VI

PART VII

PART VIII

PART IX

PART X

PART XI

PART XII

PART XIII

PART XIV

PART XV

PART XVI

PART XVII

Solution & Conclusion | IRR Part XVII

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

PROPOSED SOLUTION & CONCLUSION

As noted above, the concept of trying to meet the requirements of the capital markets the needs of the capital markets and the conflicting needs of the Sha’ariah or Halacha as the case may be, within a unitary structure is problematical. Embedding the documents favored by one structure within another only seems to cause more problems; not solve them. It is suggested that the key is to apply a more nuanced approach.

Underlying this approach is a recognition that when documents are entered into under one system of law and ethics and enforcement is sought under another contradictory system of laws and ethics, problems can and do arise.  Each system is better able to deal with its own laws and traditions and to overcome the problems they face.

Melding the competing systems creates a situation where anomalous and unpredictable results can occur.  As demonstrated with respect to the Heter Iska, precisely the wrong result was obtained in a New York lower court case, as noted above, from that which was intended under the Halacha.  There also appears to be genuine resistance in the US to enabling religious orientated forms and usages that conflict with established business norms.  This kind of push back is to be expected even in the healthiest of diverse societies, when the implicit message is, in effect, my system is morally superior to yours.  As I hope is demonstrated above, these concerns are borne more of ignorance and misperception than as a result of genuine differences.  I do believe that resolution of these issues does not lie in integrating these discordant systems of law and practice.  Rather, it is suggested the solution lies in a healthy respect of each system for the other and self-respect, as well.

Why not therefore allow each system to exist and develop on its own.  As discussed above the concept of embedding hybrid loan documents in a Sha’ariah complaint structure does not cure the problem. Indeed it would appear to cause more problems than it solves.

It is suggested that one way of accomplishing this result is to enter into Halachic or Sha’ariah compliant documents in a manner that is enforceable under the respective religious laws that created them; but, which do not require enforcement under US law, as more fully discussed below. Similarly, a separate capital markets compliant structure and set of documents would be entered into that is enforceable under US law.

In the case of Heter Iska, I have accomplished this by having the document executed in a manner, which makes it enforceable under the Halacha, but, which absolutely makes it unenforceable under US Law.  As noted above, the Heter Iska need not be enforceable under US Law to make it effective, Halachically.  The fact that the Heter Iska is or is not enforceable under US law is wholly irrelevant.  It only has to be enforceable in a Bet Din under the Halacha.  This is accomplished through the simple device of the parties themselves not signing the document.       It is also recommend that another clause be added as well.  The clause would provide that the Heter Iska could only be enforced in a Bat Din and not in any other forum; and then only in accordance with the Halacha.

In the case of the Shariah, I am relying on the Hanifa Fatwa and its progeny that permit loans on interest in a non-Islamic state, as more fully discussed above. I am also relying on the Tantawi Fatwa and to a lesser extent the Quaradawi Fatwa. As also noted below, the loan structure is non-recourse. Thus, not only is there no individual borrower or lender (both are entities), the borrower generally has no personal liability. The only qualification is that the borrower not interfere with the enforcement of the loan or violate certain covenants intended to preserve bankruptcy remoteness and the integrity of the collateral. This is often referred to as a “good guy guarantee”.

In this regard I can’t help but note that it is the lender that is taking real risks in furnishing the credit to the borrower. Indeed as between the lender and borrower, it is the lender who is taking most of the risk. If anything, the price, in terms of interest rate charged to the borrower, is most beneficial to the borrower. After all the lender is putting up most of the money to accomplish the transaction. When you look through the transaction, it is in substance the pre-fixing of return by the lender. Most borrowers don’t want the lender to be their partner in the upside. Hence they prefer to borrow as much money as possible at a fixed rate of return. Under this structure, the borrower is not personally liable on the downside. It is the assets forming the collateral package that stand for the loan.  The key to this structure, which benefits the borrower, is to satisfy the requirements of the capital markets without qualification.

Thus, it is proposed that there be a wholly capital complaint structure that fully and unequivocally satisfies the requirements of the capital market. In addition, there would be a wholly Sha’ariah compliant structure created which is separate and apart from the capital compliant structure and which does not interfere with it. The Sha’ariah compliant structure would also not require enforcement under US law.  This could be accomplished by isolating the religious oriented financing transaction from the loan transaction format. The loan transaction format would be formulated to best take advantage of the opportunities for placement through the capital markets. The Sha’ariah compliant format would similarly be structured separately to fully comply with the requirements of the Sha’ariah. This separation could be accomplished as follows:

  1. A US lending company could be formed.  It could be an actual bank or public or private lending platform.  If not a bank then a public or private lending REIT might be a useful lending entity.  This is because it is a recognized form in the marketplace and it offers tax advantages, like pass though of taxable income (i.e., no double taxation).  This is particularly useful for a foreign investor that is otherwise not taxable in the US or receives other tax concessions under certain treaties (depending on the country of origin of the ultimate lender).
  2.  The US lending company would be staffed with expert personnel who are able to originate, underwrite and process loan transactions through the capital markets.
  3. The US lending company would be capitalized in a Sha’ariah compliant manner using financing mechanisms along the lines suggested above.
  4. This kind of structure could be used for each financing transaction or as an ongoing business format.
  5. The Sha’ariah compliant capitalization of the US lending company could be made subject to binding arbitration under the Sha’ariah.  The documentation for this kind of remedy is readily available.  It has been used successfully in the analogous circumstances of a Bet Din under the Halacha and has been found to be enforceable under NY law,[1] if properly drafted, executed and effectuated in practice.
  6. The loan transaction would take the form of a typical capital markets loan transaction.  It would include a note, first mortgage, assignment of the rents and all of the special purpose entities and bankruptcy remoteness demanded by the capital markets, as the threshold requirement of accessing the favorable rates and terms achievable in this context.  As is typical, US law would govern and the documents would be enforceable in the US courts, exclusively.
  7. There would be strict separation between the Sha’ariah compliant source of funding and the Sha’ariah compliant documents and the actual lending entity and loan documents with the ultimate borrower.  If appropriate under the Sha’ariah, the US lending entity need not be run day to day by the Sha’ariah compliant capital source.  This so as not to run afoul of any rules that prohibit this kind of direct involvement under the Sha’ariah.
  8. The structure would provide that, aside from a so-called good guy guarantee, the loan would be non-recourse. This would prevent the occurrence of one of the most fundamental reasons for the prohibition against Riba. As Timur Kuran notes[2], the term Riba is derived from the word “Rib. According to Kuran the term Rib means the construct in the Koran[3] that describes how the lender abused the borrower by doubling or quadrupling the loan amount as a condition of the extension of a loan that had become due. This is the essence of Riba according to Kuran. He distinguishes this from ordinary interest. He goes on to say that the wrong that the Koran sought to interdict was what happened next. The debtor couldn’t repay the loan with so usurious a rate and was forced to lose all his property to the extortionate creditor and become a slave.  While, as noted above, modern US debtor-creditor laws and bankruptcy laws are designed to prevent just this kind of a condition (and there is no such thing as debtors’ prison in the US,) nevertheless the dangers of penury were sought to be avoided by this measure against the imposition of Riba.

It is suggested that this kind of structure[4], is permitted by the Hanafi Fatwa in the US, because it is not an Islamic state where Sha’ariah law governs. Furthermore, the typical lender, whether a bank or otherwise, is generally an entity (i.e.: a legal person) not an individual. Thus whether it is the Tantawi Fatwa or previous Fatwas dealing with Cash Waqf’s or the progeny of the Tantawi Fatwa, where under banks are allowed to pay and receive interest, there is a sound legal basis under the Sha’ariah to permit this solution. On the other hand, there are many who would object and argue that this structure nevertheless yields prohibited Riba. Be that as it may, I offer this as a proposed structure for those who might embrace it, for all the reasons discussed in this article.

It is suggested that using this kind of a structure can achieved the goals of all parties concerned.  The capital source is able to follow their religious principles without having to be concerned that somehow a US court might undo what was intended.  The borrower receives the benefit of more favorable rates and terms than would otherwise be the case.  Concomitantly, all of the terms and conditions of the capital markets, that were designed so as to afford so favorable an execution will continue to take precedence under US law, without religious complication or entanglement.  The result is the kind of predictability that each system of law intended, before they became entangled.  I can’t help but note the wisdom of our founding fathers in seeking to prevent this very kind of entanglement.


[1] See CPLR Article 75. See also The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Bet Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, by Ginnie Fried, in the Fordham Urban Law Journal (Volume 31, Issue 2, Article 8: page 644, et seq.-2003).  See also Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders by Michael A. Helfand (NYU Law Review 86-2011); and Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct by Michael A. Helfand (George Mason Law Review 19-2011).

[2] In the Logic of Financial Westernization in the Middle East, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol.56 (2005) at page 595.

[3] Ibid. See Koran 2:274-80, 3:130 and 4:160-61 as cited by Kuran

[4] Already implicit in the more modern Sukuk financing product described in Section XIV above.

Disconnect Between Riba Theory & Practice, Concerns About Separation of Church & State in US | IRR Part XVI

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN RIBA IN THEORY UNDER THE SHA’ARIAH AND IN PRACTICE

As Dr. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal[1] pointed out in his most insightful article “Incoherence of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in the Age of Financial Engineering”[2] (May 2007), there is a disconnect between the goals of Islam and the methodology chosen to avoid the strictures against Riba.

I would suggest, as noted above, there is also a disconnect between the artificial contract forms and structures used and how they might be interpreted under US law as compared to what they were intended to accomplish.

Furthermore, Dr. El Gamal notes that even when the capital markets have dealt with Sha’ariah compliant financial products (embodying equity like legal structures, so different from the loan products they are intended to mimic), they cost more than the equivalent loan product.  It is submitted that if these religious oriented financial products were actually fully tested in the US courts and the courts properly interpreted the text of these legal documents, it is likely that there would even be a greater pricing disparity.  Indeed, for good reason; because the legal structures are based on re-characterizing a loan as equity, with all of the attendant risks, including, intervening creditors, claims of lack of priority and difficulty of enforcement associated with such products.  These deficiencies usually result in pricing disparities.  Moreover, it is unclear whether there even is a summary enforcement remedy of foreclosure, which is also fundamental to the pricing of a loan product.  Frankly, it is likely that the very nature of the documents is open to question.  After all, it is not supposed to be a loan; or is it?

The response of the English courts is cogent.  They found that it’s not their business.  They chose instead to deal with the note itself and not the overlay of Sha’ariah compliant legal structures and the documents; and, as noted herein, well they should.  This is because the enforcement of these structures is fraught with all manner of legal difficulty for all the reasons noted herein and likely others as well.

This kind of analysis echoes the views of Rabbi Epstein in his work the Tosefot Bracha[3] noted above.  He noted the success of the banking function in promoting commerce and prosperity and yet it appeared to be prohibited Biblically.  There was a disconnect.  How could something so good, be so wrong?  His answer was cogent.  He found that the new world of commerce and finance was to be embraced and that this was indeed what the Talmud was suggesting, thousands of years before.  Whether it is the original Iska (part loan and part investment trust) structure or its further development in the Heter Iska, the Halacha  is not fixed; it is vibrant.  It developed mechanisms to meet the needs of the real world and market place.  Similarly the Sha’ariah and the mechanisms described above that are Sha’ariah compliant.

Nevertheless, to be fair, it requires some further practical changes, because nefarious debtors have sought to misuse the US courts to defeat their obligations.  However, if properly employed in the religious setting, only, as intended, then it serves a vital function.

In the case of a Heter Iska, ordinary loan documents can be signed and, as noted below, a separate instrument (whether on the wall and unsigned or signed only by witnesses and not the parties), resolves any religious concerns about Ribit.  This while not upsetting the requirements of the capital markets and US law.  Hence, religious matters are dealt with in a way amenable to religious authorities and the wonderful benefits offered by the capital markets are embraced.  As noted below, this kind of approach, in practice, may provide a useful solution as to how to deal with similar Sha’ariah law concerns.

Dr. El-Gamal also notes that the higher cost of the Sh’ariah compliant version of a financing, as compared to an ordinary loan, is also of concern.[4] Ideally, this should be a focus of Islamic jurists and mitigate against a wholesale rejection of the benefits of the capital markets approach under US law.  Why not find a way to accept these lower cost formats on some expedient basis? Thus, Dr. El-Gamal points out the focus on “contract forms” as a means of purporting to provide financial products and services in accordance with Islamic law or Sha’ariah may in fact be misguided.  In essence, instead of extending a mortgage loan on most favorable terms and rates, the Sha’ariah banks are purporting to buy the property first and then re-sell it to the customer in a credit priced transaction where the borrower still pays on the basis of a benchmarked implicit rate of return on capital comparable to (but higher than) prevailing mortgage rates.  He points out that this, therefore, should be viewed as fundamentally adverse to the interests of the Sha’ariah in protecting borrowers.  Why engage in this kind of exercise if the result is to hurt and not benefit borrowers? As noted above, the structures become very complicated and with each level of complication there are added concerns about enforceability and additional costs and pricing.  Moreover, ultimately, the whole structure appears to be a ruse.  There are other structures not discussed in this article that add even more additional layers of structure but the common theme is that ultimately it is all just a mechanism.  At its heart, it is just an analogue; a means by which a loan with interest is derived.  The form takes precedence over the substance.  Is this what religion has come to stand for? Do it one way, as a matter of form, and it’s OK and, yet do the very same thing in substance, using another form and it’s not.

The incoherence that Dr. El-Gamal speaks of has many different layers of application.  Frankly, as noted at the beginning of this article, the objects of each system may be the same, to facilitate the movement of capital from those with a surplus to those in need.  The methodology chosen may not always perform as intended, especially when the structure is subjected to the laws of another system.  Hence, there is further incoherence, as it were.

The solution may lie in the concepts expressed below.  Instead of forcing one religion’s internal solutions on another conflicting legal system, it may be more effective to minimize the intrusion.  Why not adopt the best each system has to offer and do so in a manner that limits interference or entanglement.  Set forth below is a possible solution.

 

BLOWBACK BECAUSE OF REAL LIFE CONCERNS ABOUT SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN THE US

There are reportedly initiatives underway in at least 7 States and reportedly as many as 22,[5] to ban the use of Sha’ariah in their State courts.

Bill Mears of CNN in discussing the matter,[6] reports that this is in reaction to a most disturbing case in New Jersey.  It would appear that  a lower court judge refused to grant a restraining order against a Muslim husband who was accused by his wife of forcing her to have sex with him.  The husband defended himself against the charge of rape by asserting he was just exercising his right as a husband under Islamic law to have marital relations when he so desired.  Thus, he was acting in accordance with his religious beliefs, albeit wholly inconsistent with US law that viewed his actions as nothing more than rape.  Fortunately, the New Jersey Appeals Court[7] intervened and overturned the lower court’s decision to deny the wife the protection of a restraining order.  The New Jersey Appeals Court found that the case “presents a conflict between the criminal law and religious precepts.”[8]  The Appeals Court went on to say “In resolving this conflict, the judge determined to exempt (the husband) from the operation of the State’s statutes as the result of his religious beliefs.  In doing so, the judge was mistaken.”[9]

Earlier this year, a Florida Senate panel approved an anti-Sha’ariah bill.  Scott Keys[10] reported that the panel deliberated for 3 minutes.  The bill had already been passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  A concurrent bill was also to be voted on in the Florida House.  The proposed legislation would ban the use of foreign laws like the Sha’ariah in Florida courts.

A similar ban was on the ballot in Oklahoma to amend the State Constitution.  The initiative was preliminarily enjoined by the Federal Court of Appeals in the 10th Circuit.[11] Under the Oklahoma version, the State Constitution was to have been amended to mandate its State courts to apply only US law and not International law like the Sha’ariah.[12]  Legislators in Louisiana, South Carolina, Utah, Tennessee, Texas and many other States are undertaking similar legislative initiatives.

There are in fact conflicts between Western law and traditions and other systems of law like the Sha’ariah.  They cannot be readily integrated.  The differences are striking and irreconcilable.  My own view is there is no reason to meld these conflicting systems of law and ethics.  Rather, they can and should continue to exist side by side, as discussed in this article.


[1] A noted Islamic scholar who is the Chair of the Islamic Economics, Finance and Management and Professor of Economics at Rice University.

[2] Supra footnote 176. See also supra footnote 179.

[3] Supra footnote 42

[4] See also Handbook of Islamic Banking, page 94, which notes that Islamic banks in England are more expensive more than conventional banks for the same types of credits. The Handbook is edited by M. Kabir Hassan and Mervyn K. Lewis.  It is published by Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. of the UK and Northampton, Mass. in the US. It may be referenced on the Internet as well.  See also “Interest and the Paradox of contemporary Islamic Law and Finance” by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal of Rice University; Losing Interest:  Financial Alchemy in Islamic, Talmudic and Western Law by Michael H. Lubetsky; Islamic and Jewish Perspectives on Interest by Joel S. Newman (89 Tax Notes 1311-12/4/2000); Contemporary Practices of Islamic Financing Techniques by Dr. Ansaf Ahmad (1993); and Issues in Islamic Banking by Mahammad Ne Jatillah Siddiquim; The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, London UK (1983/140314 at page 152).

[5] See Report by Scott Keys in ThinkProgress.org on February 29, 2012; Report by Donna Leinwand of USA Today on 12/9/2010; and Report by Bill Mears of CNN on 11/29/2010.

[6] Ibid

[7] S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super 417, 2 A.3d 412 (2010).

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Supra footnote 190

[11] Awad v. Ziriax  (Federal Court of Appeals-10th Circuit Index # 10-6273-Jan. 10, 2012).

[12] See Op Ed by Michael A. Helfand “A Law We Don’t Need” – LA Times (November 10, 2010).

Constitutional Considerations Under Establishment Clause | IRR Part XV

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

US CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Legal efforts to accommodate religious practices may sometimes violate the US Constitution by unlawfully fostering a particular religion or favoring one religious view over another within a particular religion or creed.

The First Amendment to the US Constitution contains the so-called “Establishment Clause” which prohibits the establishment of any particular religion and provides for a separation between church and state.  The First Amendment also provides for freedom of exercise of religion.  The line between permitting the free exercise of religion and the prohibition against establishing religion can sometimes be blurred.  After all, the free exercise of religion in its many various forms can sometimes lead to civil disputes among adherents to a particular religion.  Does that mean that the courts are off-limits to disputes that may involve religious as well as monetary disputes.  Where to draw the line is also a fair question.  The US Supreme Court, in dealing with these kinds of issues, has developed a body of case law that can help analyze the questions posed in this article.

The test for determining whether the enforcement of a particular principle of religious origin is constitutionally prohibited is commonly referred to as the “Lemon Test”.  It is named after the Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurzman.[1]

In the Lemon case, the Supreme Court outlined its analysis of whether the government was acting impermissibly to support the enforcement of a particular religious practice or principle.  It sets out a three-pronged test.  Thus, a law or governmental activity, dealing with a religious practice or principle, is unconstitutional, unless it satisfies all three prongs of the Lemon Test summarized below:

(i)  it has a secular purpose;

(ii) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor prohibits religion; and

(iii)            it does not foster excessive entanglement with religion.

If a law or governmental activity fails to meet any of the three prongs of the Lemon test then the law or activity violates the Establishment Clause.

To violate the secular purpose test, the law or governmental activity must be motivated wholly by religious considerations as the Supreme Court found in Lynch v. Donnelly.[2]  If there is also a secular purpose articulated then this first prong of the Lemon test is deemed satisfied.

In the case of Riba and Ribit, it is hard to justify that there is any secular purpose.  It is wholly a matter of religious law and practice.  It does not have a comparable purpose under US law, where the matter of charging interest on a loan is not wrong.  Indeed, it has become the basis of one of the most successful economic systems in history.  The only concern under US law is usury (i.e., the charging of excessive interest).  The prohibition in principle against charging any interest just does not resonate under US law and practice.  Given the lower rates of interest prevailing in our economy (especially when compared to the alternative of a wholly equity based transaction), it is fair to say that it is often the debtor who desires (or even insists) on paying interest instead of a share of the profits.  A loan is typically less expensive than the equity equivalent.  The risk and credit profile is exceedingly different for a loan (and especially a first mortgage loan against income producing property) as compared to the alternative of a partnership or other equity like investment.  There is no genuine reason for anyone to use the Heter Iska or the Sha’ariah compliant vehicles, noted above, other than to fulfill a religious obligation.

There is also no plausible secular purpose for codifying under US law these religious oriented financial structures.  The only reason to deal with them at all is to respect religious sensibilities.  While that is admirable, the Establishment Clause was designed to curtail that impulse.  This is especially so where there are differing views and practices within the religion or as to the particular religious principle at issue.  In effect, the US courts would be forced to enforce one particular view within the religion over another.  However, as noted herein, the Courts are prohibited constitutionally from choosing one religious view within a particular religion over another.  This is a critical impediment to US court involvement in what is after all a religious question, as more fully discussed below.

It is also important to note that the governmental activity may still be unconstitutional if the valid secular objectives can be readily accomplished by other means (see Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.[3]).  The secular purpose cannot be a sham or secondary to a religious objective.  While opening up additional sources of capital may be an admirable objective, it is secondary to enforcing a religious requirement.

The second prong of the Lemon Test deals with whether the law or activity has the primary or principal effect of either advancing or inhibiting the religion.  In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has further analyzed this element of the Lemon Test as precluding the endorsement or disapproval of religion.  It cannot, in effect, make Islam or Judaism the law of the land.  It is one thing to harmonize with religious canons; it is another to foster religion by endorsing an Islamic or Jewish law or practice.  Accommodation of religion is different from fostering religion.  It is a continuum and at some point it may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion (see Corporation of the Presiding Bishopric of the Church v. Amos[4]).

The second prong of the Lemon Test is violated where the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.[5]  Thus, cases involving Ribit and Riba and defining and enforcing a Heter Iska or a Sha’ariah compliant structure to mimic a loan plus interest are in effect endorsing and incorporating Halacha or the Sha’ariah into US law.  This alone may be sufficient to invalidate any court action under the Lemon Test.

The third and final prong of the Lemon Test analyzes whether there is “excessive entanglement” between government and religion.  The third prong of the Lemon Test originated in an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the United States v. Ballard.[6]  In the Ballard case, the Supreme Court held that secular courts are incompetent to determine the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.

In the Presbyterian Church v. Mary Blur Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church[7] case, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment Establishment Clause prohibits government from resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine or from employing organs of government for essentially religious purposes.  The government may not determine issues of religious doctrine.  Moreover, the job of making these determinations cannot be delegated by the government to religious authorities and then enforced by the government.  In essence, under those circumstances, the government would be enforcing the decisions of a religious body over members of its religion.  This is especially so where there were disputes within the religion as to the appropriateness of a particular doctrine espoused by some, but not all, of the members of that religion.  This kind of court intervention would constitute excessive entanglement.

The very terms “Ribit” and “Riba” are inherently religious in meaning.  They do not have a corresponding term under US law.  As noted above, while loosely defined to mean interest, the actual meaning of the terms encompasses all manner of transactions that would not be defined as interest under US law.  Moreover, within the applicable religious laws, there are serious disagreements as to what constitutes a prohibited  transaction and what is permitted.

Thus, there are eminent Islamic scholars and authorities that assert that Riba means the equivalent of compound interest (i.e., interest on interest[8]) and not ordinary interest.  Furthermore, the original Biblical proscription has greatly expanded over time been by Rabbinic or other enactment under the Halacha.  This has similarly  been the case under the Sha’ariah.  Thus, what is or is not Ribit or Riba has changed over time and is not universally accepted by all members or authorities within the applicable religion.

The purpose and intent of the Heter Iska under the Halacha is religious in nature.  Similarly, the Ijara, Murabaha and Musharaka are also religious in purpose and intent.  Expert religious authorities are required to interpret these religious oriented structures and documents properly, as intended.  Indeed, even with the help of religious experts they are still subject to misinterpretation.  The results that might be obtained in a wholly religious context can and do differ from what a US court might find.  Indeed, as shown above, a US court might render a wholly unintended (and even wrongful) result from a religious prospective.  Moreover, religious exerts can and do disagree.  As shown above, there are legitimate differences among religious authorities.

Consider another example of this Constitutional issue in practice.  The government has attempted to deal with matters of Kashrus and Halal.  It has created organs of government that were designed to enforce standards of what is Kosher and what is Halal.  However, there is no universally accepted standard of just what is Kosher and what is Halal within the respective religions.  The Government’s attempts to legislate a definition in accordance with a particular standard have been rejected by a number of courts as unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.  For example the NJ Supreme Court[9] recently threw out the New Jersey Kashrus Law because of the Constitutional principle of separation of Church and State.  This is because the definition of the term “Kosher”[10] can only be decided under religious law.  There are divergent views as to the meaning of the term.  If the US courts require religious scholars to testify as to the meaning of the term religiously, then it violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.  Moreover, not everyone within the religion agrees as to the meaning of the term Kosher.  There are different standards enunciated by various authorities within the religion.  Defining kosher as in accordance with a particular standard was held to be excessive entanglement of the sort prohibited by the Constitution.[11]

The term Halal[12] is similarly the subject of divergent views.  Thus, for example, whether a particular prayer is recited at the moment of slaughtering or not can make something that is Halal according to many, Haram[13] according to some.

Championing one view over another within a particular religion is just the sort of excessive entanglement the Establishment Clause (and the case law thereunder) was intended to curtail.

Consider too that both the terms Kosher and Halal, on the one hand, and Ribit and Riba, on the other hand, are defined and encompassed within the body of law within their respective religions dealing with sins.[14]  This as opposed to matters of commerce between parties.  In Halacha, the body of law encompassing the laws of what is and isn’t Kosher are known as Yoreh Deah.[15]  The laws of business and other interactions between one individual and another are known as Choshen Mishpat.[16]  Interestingly, the law of Ribit is not a part of the section known as Chosen Mishpat.  Rather, it is a part of the body of law known as Yoreh Deah (just like the laws of what is and is not Kosher).  Similarly, the term Halal and the fact that if something is not Halal it is Haram (i.e., it is a sin to violate this requirement).

Violating these religious laws is not a matter of civil liability.  Instead, it is a matter of sin.  How more religious can the terms be? Indeed, but for the Biblical prohibition (that is the religious source of these rules), they would not have been prohibited in the natural order of things.

Consider how Western civilization developed the concepts of trade and commerce and how vital the banking/lender function is to the proper functioning of the economy and society.  Thus as a matter of rational development of laws, there is no intuitive bar to charging interest.  Indeed, the contrary is likely true.  Hence the US laws that permit and, indeed, encourage the loan/interest structure, as a foundational element in our economy.  The first mortgage loan financing structure (and the capital markets that encompass this financing product) developed naturally over time.  As it turns out, it yielded an enormous benefit to society, in the form of substantially lower cost of funds than was prevalent at the time when the religious rules against charging interest were first promulgated.[17] As many Halachic and Sha’ariah religious scholars agree,[18] the capital markets have benefitted and not burdened our society.  In line with the foregoing, usury (excessive interest) is prohibited under US law.  Ordinary and reasonable rates of interest are encouraged.  These substantive issues are at the heart of the problem, since choosing one view over another within the religion constitutes excessive entanglement.  In this regard, I can’t help but note the trend in Sha’ariah compliant banks to have a religious board that supervises various aspects of lending.  This goes beyond just dealing with the permissible versus impermissible loan structures (that would constitute prohibited Riba); it goes to whether the intended purpose of the loan is Haram.  Thus, a loan to a developer for the purpose of creating a drinking establishment (or other such prohibited uses under the Sha’ariah) might be rejected because it is Haram.  The government, in enabling this kind of banking establishment and insuring bank accounts, as well as, creating a secondary market (Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae) to purchase Sha’ariah compliant (wholly religiously motivated financing) products, may be violating the third prong of the Lemon Test.

The kind of governmental actions noted above may even violate the second and even the first prong of the Lemon Test.  In essence, the Government is enabling a religious view and delegating to a religious board its role as an organ of government.  It is empowering the religiously oriented bank to act for purely religious purposes.  In doing so it is also endorsing it.  This goes well beyond excessive entanglement.

Beyond the Lemon Test, there is also the test enunciated in Larson v. Valente.[19]  In the Larson case, the Supreme Court held that, even where the Lemon Test is not violated per se, there can still be an issue of choosing one religious denomination over another.  One religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.  Taking sides in a religious matter, effectively discriminating in favor of one sect requires the state to take an official position on religious doctrine and creates an impermissible fusion of governmental and religious functions by delegating civic authority to individuals or bodies chosen according to religious criteria (see Commack Self-service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss).[20] Deferring to the interpretation of religious authorities in reaching an official position constitutes excessive entanglement under these circumstances.  It is impermissible for the state including a court to weigh the significance and the meaning of disputed religious doctrine (see Presbyterian Church in the US v. Mary Blue Hull[21]).   Similarly, can’t employ a religious organization as an arm of the civil [government] to perform the function of interpreting and applying state standards.[22]

We are a land of toleration and of diversity of views.  Our country has thrived on the principles enunciated in the First Amendment Establishment Clause that prohibits just this kind of governmental activity.  People should not be required to accept religious practices contrary to their own religious beliefs.  Efforts by the courts or government to interfere with the religious beliefs and the free exercise of religion by individuals are just wrong.

Rather than seeking protection by the government of a particular religious view or practice, recourse should be had to religious authorities as to religious matters.  The Establishment Clause was enacted for this very purpose.  As the Supreme Court stated in McCollum v. Board of Education,[23] by allowing government to interpret a inherently religious term and impose its interpretation on members of that religion is constitutionally defective.  The government, including the courts, should not be interpreting religious doctrine and its proper application.  A US court should not be deciding who is a good Christian, Jew or Muslim and whether their actions are right or wrong from a religious point of view.  This not only violates the Establishment Clause it could possibly lead to interference with free exercise as well.  As noted below, the better view constitutionally is to allow each to function within their own sphere and not mix religious practices with financing structures, but more on this below.  Both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within their respective sphere.”

Denominational preference violates the Establishment Cause (see Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meats and Food Control,[24] a 4th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, citing Larson v. Valente, Hernandez v. Commissioner[25] and of course the Lemon case.  It is impermissible for the court to sponsor one view and create a symbolic union between church and state (see Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.,[26] and see also Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc v. New Jersey.[27] The Larson[28] denominational preference test takes precedence over Lemon.  The concept predates Lemon (see Hernandez, see also the Estate of Thorton, et al v. Caldor.[29])  In the Thorton case, the court struck down a Connecticut blue law.  The court held that government can’t impose an absolute duty on businesses to conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of the employee.  An individual in pursuit of his own religious views can’t use the courts to impose those views on others and force them to conform their conduct to his own religious beliefs.[30]  Government action that has the primary, not incidental or remote, effect of impermissibly advancing a particular religious practice, is constitutionally prohibited.  It conveys a message of endorsement of a particular religious belief to the detriment of those who don’t share that belief, a’la Lynch.[31]

The English courts have taken a similar position.  Thus in Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf v. Symphony Gems NV[32] and in Beximco Pharmaceutical v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain,[33] there were assertions made that the markup charged was prohibited Riba and that Islamic Sha’ariah Law governed.  In both cases, the English Courts reasoned that the Sha’ariah was not the recognized law of the State.  Moreover, different Islamic legal scholars might differ in practice as to whether a particular structure was or was not prohibited Riba.  The English Courts determined that they could apply English law only.


[1] 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

[2] 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)

[3] 459 U.S. 116, 123-124 (1982)

[4] 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)

[5] Id. at 337

[6] 322 U.S. 78 (1944)

[7] 393 U.S. 440 (1969)

[8] Infra footnote 86

[9] See discussion below

[10]A term that denotes the fact that only certain types of meat, fish and fowl may be eaten and then only after satisfying the requirements for ritual slaughtering, salting and watering, as applicable, as well as other detailed rules and regulations (including no mixing of meat and milk products), collectively referred to as the Laws of Kashrut.

[11] I.e., under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

[12] An equivalent concept to Kosher; but under the Sha’ariah, with its own detailed rules and regulations.

[13] Forbidden under the Sha’ariah (the equivalent of a sin).

[14] Yoreh Deah vs. Choshen Mishpat

[15] A codification of the Halacha (set out topically) by Rav Yosef Karo. It is viewed as one of the most definitive works of the Halacha.

[16] The Volume dealing with commercial law by Rav Yosef Karo.

[17] See Section 88 of the Code of Hammurabi and the 20% interest rate noted therein. In the Middle Ages, rates even higher rates were prevalent.

[18] See the discussion relating to the Sha’ariah below.

[19] 456 U.S. 228 (1982)

[20] 204 F3rd 415 (2001)

[21] Supra footnote 158

[22] Id. at 451. Furthermore, in the case of the religious advisory board for a Sha’ariah compliant bank, there is in effect state reliance or sponsorship of a religious authority on matters of religious doctrine. It provides a symbolic, and more so an actual benefit, in sponsoring the activities of one view and in effect disparaging other views within the same religion.

[23] 33 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)

[24] 66 F3rd 1337 (4th Cir.-1995).

[25] 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989)

[26] 459 U.S. 116, 125-126 (1982)

[27] 608 A.2nd 1365 (NJ-1992); cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 1366  (1993)

[28] 608 A2nd 1353 (NJ-1992).

[29] 472 U.S. 703 (1985)

[30] Justice Learned Hand cited in the Burger[30] decision at page 709

[31] See discussion of Lynch above.

[32] 2002 WL 346969  (QBD–Comm Ct-2002)

[33] 1 W.L.R. 1784 (Court of Appeals England and Wales-2004)