Tag Archives: Ribit

Leonard Grunstein Gives Lecture at Yeshivat Sha’alvim

Leonard Grunstein recently gave a lecture at Yeshivat Sha’alvim on religious law and interest. Opening remarks were given by Rav Yechezkel Yakovson and Rabbi Asher Weiss, respected teachers and thinkers within the community. Grunstein’s lecture revolved around his article titled, “Interest, Ribit and Riba,” which was published in The Banking Law Journal in 2013. The article analyzes Sharia finance, and proposes a way to reconcile capitalist and Islamic financial markets. The full text of his article can be found here, and the lecture can be viewed in its entirety by following the link below:

http://new.livestream.com/accounts/665286/shaalvim?utm_source=Grunstein+Event_Feb+2015&utm_campaign=grunstein+1&utm_medium=email

The conference program can be found, here.

Interest, Ribit and Riba

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

PART I

PART II

PART III

PART IV

PART V

PART VI

PART VII

PART VIII

PART IX

PART X

PART XI

PART XII

PART XIII

PART XIV

PART XV

PART XVI

PART XVII

Solution & Conclusion | IRR Part XVII

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

PROPOSED SOLUTION & CONCLUSION

As noted above, the concept of trying to meet the requirements of the capital markets the needs of the capital markets and the conflicting needs of the Sha’ariah or Halacha as the case may be, within a unitary structure is problematical. Embedding the documents favored by one structure within another only seems to cause more problems; not solve them. It is suggested that the key is to apply a more nuanced approach.

Underlying this approach is a recognition that when documents are entered into under one system of law and ethics and enforcement is sought under another contradictory system of laws and ethics, problems can and do arise.  Each system is better able to deal with its own laws and traditions and to overcome the problems they face.

Melding the competing systems creates a situation where anomalous and unpredictable results can occur.  As demonstrated with respect to the Heter Iska, precisely the wrong result was obtained in a New York lower court case, as noted above, from that which was intended under the Halacha.  There also appears to be genuine resistance in the US to enabling religious orientated forms and usages that conflict with established business norms.  This kind of push back is to be expected even in the healthiest of diverse societies, when the implicit message is, in effect, my system is morally superior to yours.  As I hope is demonstrated above, these concerns are borne more of ignorance and misperception than as a result of genuine differences.  I do believe that resolution of these issues does not lie in integrating these discordant systems of law and practice.  Rather, it is suggested the solution lies in a healthy respect of each system for the other and self-respect, as well.

Why not therefore allow each system to exist and develop on its own.  As discussed above the concept of embedding hybrid loan documents in a Sha’ariah complaint structure does not cure the problem. Indeed it would appear to cause more problems than it solves.

It is suggested that one way of accomplishing this result is to enter into Halachic or Sha’ariah compliant documents in a manner that is enforceable under the respective religious laws that created them; but, which do not require enforcement under US law, as more fully discussed below. Similarly, a separate capital markets compliant structure and set of documents would be entered into that is enforceable under US law.

In the case of Heter Iska, I have accomplished this by having the document executed in a manner, which makes it enforceable under the Halacha, but, which absolutely makes it unenforceable under US Law.  As noted above, the Heter Iska need not be enforceable under US Law to make it effective, Halachically.  The fact that the Heter Iska is or is not enforceable under US law is wholly irrelevant.  It only has to be enforceable in a Bet Din under the Halacha.  This is accomplished through the simple device of the parties themselves not signing the document.       It is also recommend that another clause be added as well.  The clause would provide that the Heter Iska could only be enforced in a Bat Din and not in any other forum; and then only in accordance with the Halacha.

In the case of the Shariah, I am relying on the Hanifa Fatwa and its progeny that permit loans on interest in a non-Islamic state, as more fully discussed above. I am also relying on the Tantawi Fatwa and to a lesser extent the Quaradawi Fatwa. As also noted below, the loan structure is non-recourse. Thus, not only is there no individual borrower or lender (both are entities), the borrower generally has no personal liability. The only qualification is that the borrower not interfere with the enforcement of the loan or violate certain covenants intended to preserve bankruptcy remoteness and the integrity of the collateral. This is often referred to as a “good guy guarantee”.

In this regard I can’t help but note that it is the lender that is taking real risks in furnishing the credit to the borrower. Indeed as between the lender and borrower, it is the lender who is taking most of the risk. If anything, the price, in terms of interest rate charged to the borrower, is most beneficial to the borrower. After all the lender is putting up most of the money to accomplish the transaction. When you look through the transaction, it is in substance the pre-fixing of return by the lender. Most borrowers don’t want the lender to be their partner in the upside. Hence they prefer to borrow as much money as possible at a fixed rate of return. Under this structure, the borrower is not personally liable on the downside. It is the assets forming the collateral package that stand for the loan.  The key to this structure, which benefits the borrower, is to satisfy the requirements of the capital markets without qualification.

Thus, it is proposed that there be a wholly capital complaint structure that fully and unequivocally satisfies the requirements of the capital market. In addition, there would be a wholly Sha’ariah compliant structure created which is separate and apart from the capital compliant structure and which does not interfere with it. The Sha’ariah compliant structure would also not require enforcement under US law.  This could be accomplished by isolating the religious oriented financing transaction from the loan transaction format. The loan transaction format would be formulated to best take advantage of the opportunities for placement through the capital markets. The Sha’ariah compliant format would similarly be structured separately to fully comply with the requirements of the Sha’ariah. This separation could be accomplished as follows:

  1. A US lending company could be formed.  It could be an actual bank or public or private lending platform.  If not a bank then a public or private lending REIT might be a useful lending entity.  This is because it is a recognized form in the marketplace and it offers tax advantages, like pass though of taxable income (i.e., no double taxation).  This is particularly useful for a foreign investor that is otherwise not taxable in the US or receives other tax concessions under certain treaties (depending on the country of origin of the ultimate lender).
  2.  The US lending company would be staffed with expert personnel who are able to originate, underwrite and process loan transactions through the capital markets.
  3. The US lending company would be capitalized in a Sha’ariah compliant manner using financing mechanisms along the lines suggested above.
  4. This kind of structure could be used for each financing transaction or as an ongoing business format.
  5. The Sha’ariah compliant capitalization of the US lending company could be made subject to binding arbitration under the Sha’ariah.  The documentation for this kind of remedy is readily available.  It has been used successfully in the analogous circumstances of a Bet Din under the Halacha and has been found to be enforceable under NY law,[1] if properly drafted, executed and effectuated in practice.
  6. The loan transaction would take the form of a typical capital markets loan transaction.  It would include a note, first mortgage, assignment of the rents and all of the special purpose entities and bankruptcy remoteness demanded by the capital markets, as the threshold requirement of accessing the favorable rates and terms achievable in this context.  As is typical, US law would govern and the documents would be enforceable in the US courts, exclusively.
  7. There would be strict separation between the Sha’ariah compliant source of funding and the Sha’ariah compliant documents and the actual lending entity and loan documents with the ultimate borrower.  If appropriate under the Sha’ariah, the US lending entity need not be run day to day by the Sha’ariah compliant capital source.  This so as not to run afoul of any rules that prohibit this kind of direct involvement under the Sha’ariah.
  8. The structure would provide that, aside from a so-called good guy guarantee, the loan would be non-recourse. This would prevent the occurrence of one of the most fundamental reasons for the prohibition against Riba. As Timur Kuran notes[2], the term Riba is derived from the word “Rib. According to Kuran the term Rib means the construct in the Koran[3] that describes how the lender abused the borrower by doubling or quadrupling the loan amount as a condition of the extension of a loan that had become due. This is the essence of Riba according to Kuran. He distinguishes this from ordinary interest. He goes on to say that the wrong that the Koran sought to interdict was what happened next. The debtor couldn’t repay the loan with so usurious a rate and was forced to lose all his property to the extortionate creditor and become a slave.  While, as noted above, modern US debtor-creditor laws and bankruptcy laws are designed to prevent just this kind of a condition (and there is no such thing as debtors’ prison in the US,) nevertheless the dangers of penury were sought to be avoided by this measure against the imposition of Riba.

It is suggested that this kind of structure[4], is permitted by the Hanafi Fatwa in the US, because it is not an Islamic state where Sha’ariah law governs. Furthermore, the typical lender, whether a bank or otherwise, is generally an entity (i.e.: a legal person) not an individual. Thus whether it is the Tantawi Fatwa or previous Fatwas dealing with Cash Waqf’s or the progeny of the Tantawi Fatwa, where under banks are allowed to pay and receive interest, there is a sound legal basis under the Sha’ariah to permit this solution. On the other hand, there are many who would object and argue that this structure nevertheless yields prohibited Riba. Be that as it may, I offer this as a proposed structure for those who might embrace it, for all the reasons discussed in this article.

It is suggested that using this kind of a structure can achieved the goals of all parties concerned.  The capital source is able to follow their religious principles without having to be concerned that somehow a US court might undo what was intended.  The borrower receives the benefit of more favorable rates and terms than would otherwise be the case.  Concomitantly, all of the terms and conditions of the capital markets, that were designed so as to afford so favorable an execution will continue to take precedence under US law, without religious complication or entanglement.  The result is the kind of predictability that each system of law intended, before they became entangled.  I can’t help but note the wisdom of our founding fathers in seeking to prevent this very kind of entanglement.


[1] See CPLR Article 75. See also The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Bet Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, by Ginnie Fried, in the Fordham Urban Law Journal (Volume 31, Issue 2, Article 8: page 644, et seq.-2003).  See also Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders by Michael A. Helfand (NYU Law Review 86-2011); and Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct by Michael A. Helfand (George Mason Law Review 19-2011).

[2] In the Logic of Financial Westernization in the Middle East, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol.56 (2005) at page 595.

[3] Ibid. See Koran 2:274-80, 3:130 and 4:160-61 as cited by Kuran

[4] Already implicit in the more modern Sukuk financing product described in Section XIV above.

Constitutional Considerations Under Establishment Clause | IRR Part XV

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

US CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Legal efforts to accommodate religious practices may sometimes violate the US Constitution by unlawfully fostering a particular religion or favoring one religious view over another within a particular religion or creed.

The First Amendment to the US Constitution contains the so-called “Establishment Clause” which prohibits the establishment of any particular religion and provides for a separation between church and state.  The First Amendment also provides for freedom of exercise of religion.  The line between permitting the free exercise of religion and the prohibition against establishing religion can sometimes be blurred.  After all, the free exercise of religion in its many various forms can sometimes lead to civil disputes among adherents to a particular religion.  Does that mean that the courts are off-limits to disputes that may involve religious as well as monetary disputes.  Where to draw the line is also a fair question.  The US Supreme Court, in dealing with these kinds of issues, has developed a body of case law that can help analyze the questions posed in this article.

The test for determining whether the enforcement of a particular principle of religious origin is constitutionally prohibited is commonly referred to as the “Lemon Test”.  It is named after the Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurzman.[1]

In the Lemon case, the Supreme Court outlined its analysis of whether the government was acting impermissibly to support the enforcement of a particular religious practice or principle.  It sets out a three-pronged test.  Thus, a law or governmental activity, dealing with a religious practice or principle, is unconstitutional, unless it satisfies all three prongs of the Lemon Test summarized below:

(i)  it has a secular purpose;

(ii) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor prohibits religion; and

(iii)            it does not foster excessive entanglement with religion.

If a law or governmental activity fails to meet any of the three prongs of the Lemon test then the law or activity violates the Establishment Clause.

To violate the secular purpose test, the law or governmental activity must be motivated wholly by religious considerations as the Supreme Court found in Lynch v. Donnelly.[2]  If there is also a secular purpose articulated then this first prong of the Lemon test is deemed satisfied.

In the case of Riba and Ribit, it is hard to justify that there is any secular purpose.  It is wholly a matter of religious law and practice.  It does not have a comparable purpose under US law, where the matter of charging interest on a loan is not wrong.  Indeed, it has become the basis of one of the most successful economic systems in history.  The only concern under US law is usury (i.e., the charging of excessive interest).  The prohibition in principle against charging any interest just does not resonate under US law and practice.  Given the lower rates of interest prevailing in our economy (especially when compared to the alternative of a wholly equity based transaction), it is fair to say that it is often the debtor who desires (or even insists) on paying interest instead of a share of the profits.  A loan is typically less expensive than the equity equivalent.  The risk and credit profile is exceedingly different for a loan (and especially a first mortgage loan against income producing property) as compared to the alternative of a partnership or other equity like investment.  There is no genuine reason for anyone to use the Heter Iska or the Sha’ariah compliant vehicles, noted above, other than to fulfill a religious obligation.

There is also no plausible secular purpose for codifying under US law these religious oriented financial structures.  The only reason to deal with them at all is to respect religious sensibilities.  While that is admirable, the Establishment Clause was designed to curtail that impulse.  This is especially so where there are differing views and practices within the religion or as to the particular religious principle at issue.  In effect, the US courts would be forced to enforce one particular view within the religion over another.  However, as noted herein, the Courts are prohibited constitutionally from choosing one religious view within a particular religion over another.  This is a critical impediment to US court involvement in what is after all a religious question, as more fully discussed below.

It is also important to note that the governmental activity may still be unconstitutional if the valid secular objectives can be readily accomplished by other means (see Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.[3]).  The secular purpose cannot be a sham or secondary to a religious objective.  While opening up additional sources of capital may be an admirable objective, it is secondary to enforcing a religious requirement.

The second prong of the Lemon Test deals with whether the law or activity has the primary or principal effect of either advancing or inhibiting the religion.  In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has further analyzed this element of the Lemon Test as precluding the endorsement or disapproval of religion.  It cannot, in effect, make Islam or Judaism the law of the land.  It is one thing to harmonize with religious canons; it is another to foster religion by endorsing an Islamic or Jewish law or practice.  Accommodation of religion is different from fostering religion.  It is a continuum and at some point it may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion (see Corporation of the Presiding Bishopric of the Church v. Amos[4]).

The second prong of the Lemon Test is violated where the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.[5]  Thus, cases involving Ribit and Riba and defining and enforcing a Heter Iska or a Sha’ariah compliant structure to mimic a loan plus interest are in effect endorsing and incorporating Halacha or the Sha’ariah into US law.  This alone may be sufficient to invalidate any court action under the Lemon Test.

The third and final prong of the Lemon Test analyzes whether there is “excessive entanglement” between government and religion.  The third prong of the Lemon Test originated in an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the United States v. Ballard.[6]  In the Ballard case, the Supreme Court held that secular courts are incompetent to determine the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.

In the Presbyterian Church v. Mary Blur Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church[7] case, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment Establishment Clause prohibits government from resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine or from employing organs of government for essentially religious purposes.  The government may not determine issues of religious doctrine.  Moreover, the job of making these determinations cannot be delegated by the government to religious authorities and then enforced by the government.  In essence, under those circumstances, the government would be enforcing the decisions of a religious body over members of its religion.  This is especially so where there were disputes within the religion as to the appropriateness of a particular doctrine espoused by some, but not all, of the members of that religion.  This kind of court intervention would constitute excessive entanglement.

The very terms “Ribit” and “Riba” are inherently religious in meaning.  They do not have a corresponding term under US law.  As noted above, while loosely defined to mean interest, the actual meaning of the terms encompasses all manner of transactions that would not be defined as interest under US law.  Moreover, within the applicable religious laws, there are serious disagreements as to what constitutes a prohibited  transaction and what is permitted.

Thus, there are eminent Islamic scholars and authorities that assert that Riba means the equivalent of compound interest (i.e., interest on interest[8]) and not ordinary interest.  Furthermore, the original Biblical proscription has greatly expanded over time been by Rabbinic or other enactment under the Halacha.  This has similarly  been the case under the Sha’ariah.  Thus, what is or is not Ribit or Riba has changed over time and is not universally accepted by all members or authorities within the applicable religion.

The purpose and intent of the Heter Iska under the Halacha is religious in nature.  Similarly, the Ijara, Murabaha and Musharaka are also religious in purpose and intent.  Expert religious authorities are required to interpret these religious oriented structures and documents properly, as intended.  Indeed, even with the help of religious experts they are still subject to misinterpretation.  The results that might be obtained in a wholly religious context can and do differ from what a US court might find.  Indeed, as shown above, a US court might render a wholly unintended (and even wrongful) result from a religious prospective.  Moreover, religious exerts can and do disagree.  As shown above, there are legitimate differences among religious authorities.

Consider another example of this Constitutional issue in practice.  The government has attempted to deal with matters of Kashrus and Halal.  It has created organs of government that were designed to enforce standards of what is Kosher and what is Halal.  However, there is no universally accepted standard of just what is Kosher and what is Halal within the respective religions.  The Government’s attempts to legislate a definition in accordance with a particular standard have been rejected by a number of courts as unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.  For example the NJ Supreme Court[9] recently threw out the New Jersey Kashrus Law because of the Constitutional principle of separation of Church and State.  This is because the definition of the term “Kosher”[10] can only be decided under religious law.  There are divergent views as to the meaning of the term.  If the US courts require religious scholars to testify as to the meaning of the term religiously, then it violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.  Moreover, not everyone within the religion agrees as to the meaning of the term Kosher.  There are different standards enunciated by various authorities within the religion.  Defining kosher as in accordance with a particular standard was held to be excessive entanglement of the sort prohibited by the Constitution.[11]

The term Halal[12] is similarly the subject of divergent views.  Thus, for example, whether a particular prayer is recited at the moment of slaughtering or not can make something that is Halal according to many, Haram[13] according to some.

Championing one view over another within a particular religion is just the sort of excessive entanglement the Establishment Clause (and the case law thereunder) was intended to curtail.

Consider too that both the terms Kosher and Halal, on the one hand, and Ribit and Riba, on the other hand, are defined and encompassed within the body of law within their respective religions dealing with sins.[14]  This as opposed to matters of commerce between parties.  In Halacha, the body of law encompassing the laws of what is and isn’t Kosher are known as Yoreh Deah.[15]  The laws of business and other interactions between one individual and another are known as Choshen Mishpat.[16]  Interestingly, the law of Ribit is not a part of the section known as Chosen Mishpat.  Rather, it is a part of the body of law known as Yoreh Deah (just like the laws of what is and is not Kosher).  Similarly, the term Halal and the fact that if something is not Halal it is Haram (i.e., it is a sin to violate this requirement).

Violating these religious laws is not a matter of civil liability.  Instead, it is a matter of sin.  How more religious can the terms be? Indeed, but for the Biblical prohibition (that is the religious source of these rules), they would not have been prohibited in the natural order of things.

Consider how Western civilization developed the concepts of trade and commerce and how vital the banking/lender function is to the proper functioning of the economy and society.  Thus as a matter of rational development of laws, there is no intuitive bar to charging interest.  Indeed, the contrary is likely true.  Hence the US laws that permit and, indeed, encourage the loan/interest structure, as a foundational element in our economy.  The first mortgage loan financing structure (and the capital markets that encompass this financing product) developed naturally over time.  As it turns out, it yielded an enormous benefit to society, in the form of substantially lower cost of funds than was prevalent at the time when the religious rules against charging interest were first promulgated.[17] As many Halachic and Sha’ariah religious scholars agree,[18] the capital markets have benefitted and not burdened our society.  In line with the foregoing, usury (excessive interest) is prohibited under US law.  Ordinary and reasonable rates of interest are encouraged.  These substantive issues are at the heart of the problem, since choosing one view over another within the religion constitutes excessive entanglement.  In this regard, I can’t help but note the trend in Sha’ariah compliant banks to have a religious board that supervises various aspects of lending.  This goes beyond just dealing with the permissible versus impermissible loan structures (that would constitute prohibited Riba); it goes to whether the intended purpose of the loan is Haram.  Thus, a loan to a developer for the purpose of creating a drinking establishment (or other such prohibited uses under the Sha’ariah) might be rejected because it is Haram.  The government, in enabling this kind of banking establishment and insuring bank accounts, as well as, creating a secondary market (Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae) to purchase Sha’ariah compliant (wholly religiously motivated financing) products, may be violating the third prong of the Lemon Test.

The kind of governmental actions noted above may even violate the second and even the first prong of the Lemon Test.  In essence, the Government is enabling a religious view and delegating to a religious board its role as an organ of government.  It is empowering the religiously oriented bank to act for purely religious purposes.  In doing so it is also endorsing it.  This goes well beyond excessive entanglement.

Beyond the Lemon Test, there is also the test enunciated in Larson v. Valente.[19]  In the Larson case, the Supreme Court held that, even where the Lemon Test is not violated per se, there can still be an issue of choosing one religious denomination over another.  One religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.  Taking sides in a religious matter, effectively discriminating in favor of one sect requires the state to take an official position on religious doctrine and creates an impermissible fusion of governmental and religious functions by delegating civic authority to individuals or bodies chosen according to religious criteria (see Commack Self-service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss).[20] Deferring to the interpretation of religious authorities in reaching an official position constitutes excessive entanglement under these circumstances.  It is impermissible for the state including a court to weigh the significance and the meaning of disputed religious doctrine (see Presbyterian Church in the US v. Mary Blue Hull[21]).   Similarly, can’t employ a religious organization as an arm of the civil [government] to perform the function of interpreting and applying state standards.[22]

We are a land of toleration and of diversity of views.  Our country has thrived on the principles enunciated in the First Amendment Establishment Clause that prohibits just this kind of governmental activity.  People should not be required to accept religious practices contrary to their own religious beliefs.  Efforts by the courts or government to interfere with the religious beliefs and the free exercise of religion by individuals are just wrong.

Rather than seeking protection by the government of a particular religious view or practice, recourse should be had to religious authorities as to religious matters.  The Establishment Clause was enacted for this very purpose.  As the Supreme Court stated in McCollum v. Board of Education,[23] by allowing government to interpret a inherently religious term and impose its interpretation on members of that religion is constitutionally defective.  The government, including the courts, should not be interpreting religious doctrine and its proper application.  A US court should not be deciding who is a good Christian, Jew or Muslim and whether their actions are right or wrong from a religious point of view.  This not only violates the Establishment Clause it could possibly lead to interference with free exercise as well.  As noted below, the better view constitutionally is to allow each to function within their own sphere and not mix religious practices with financing structures, but more on this below.  Both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within their respective sphere.”

Denominational preference violates the Establishment Cause (see Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meats and Food Control,[24] a 4th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, citing Larson v. Valente, Hernandez v. Commissioner[25] and of course the Lemon case.  It is impermissible for the court to sponsor one view and create a symbolic union between church and state (see Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.,[26] and see also Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc v. New Jersey.[27] The Larson[28] denominational preference test takes precedence over Lemon.  The concept predates Lemon (see Hernandez, see also the Estate of Thorton, et al v. Caldor.[29])  In the Thorton case, the court struck down a Connecticut blue law.  The court held that government can’t impose an absolute duty on businesses to conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of the employee.  An individual in pursuit of his own religious views can’t use the courts to impose those views on others and force them to conform their conduct to his own religious beliefs.[30]  Government action that has the primary, not incidental or remote, effect of impermissibly advancing a particular religious practice, is constitutionally prohibited.  It conveys a message of endorsement of a particular religious belief to the detriment of those who don’t share that belief, a’la Lynch.[31]

The English courts have taken a similar position.  Thus in Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf v. Symphony Gems NV[32] and in Beximco Pharmaceutical v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain,[33] there were assertions made that the markup charged was prohibited Riba and that Islamic Sha’ariah Law governed.  In both cases, the English Courts reasoned that the Sha’ariah was not the recognized law of the State.  Moreover, different Islamic legal scholars might differ in practice as to whether a particular structure was or was not prohibited Riba.  The English Courts determined that they could apply English law only.


[1] 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

[2] 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)

[3] 459 U.S. 116, 123-124 (1982)

[4] 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)

[5] Id. at 337

[6] 322 U.S. 78 (1944)

[7] 393 U.S. 440 (1969)

[8] Infra footnote 86

[9] See discussion below

[10]A term that denotes the fact that only certain types of meat, fish and fowl may be eaten and then only after satisfying the requirements for ritual slaughtering, salting and watering, as applicable, as well as other detailed rules and regulations (including no mixing of meat and milk products), collectively referred to as the Laws of Kashrut.

[11] I.e., under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

[12] An equivalent concept to Kosher; but under the Sha’ariah, with its own detailed rules and regulations.

[13] Forbidden under the Sha’ariah (the equivalent of a sin).

[14] Yoreh Deah vs. Choshen Mishpat

[15] A codification of the Halacha (set out topically) by Rav Yosef Karo. It is viewed as one of the most definitive works of the Halacha.

[16] The Volume dealing with commercial law by Rav Yosef Karo.

[17] See Section 88 of the Code of Hammurabi and the 20% interest rate noted therein. In the Middle Ages, rates even higher rates were prevalent.

[18] See the discussion relating to the Sha’ariah below.

[19] 456 U.S. 228 (1982)

[20] 204 F3rd 415 (2001)

[21] Supra footnote 158

[22] Id. at 451. Furthermore, in the case of the religious advisory board for a Sha’ariah compliant bank, there is in effect state reliance or sponsorship of a religious authority on matters of religious doctrine. It provides a symbolic, and more so an actual benefit, in sponsoring the activities of one view and in effect disparaging other views within the same religion.

[23] 33 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)

[24] 66 F3rd 1337 (4th Cir.-1995).

[25] 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989)

[26] 459 U.S. 116, 125-126 (1982)

[27] 608 A.2nd 1365 (NJ-1992); cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 1366  (1993)

[28] 608 A2nd 1353 (NJ-1992).

[29] 472 U.S. 703 (1985)

[30] Justice Learned Hand cited in the Burger[30] decision at page 709

[31] See discussion of Lynch above.

[32] 2002 WL 346969  (QBD–Comm Ct-2002)

[33] 1 W.L.R. 1784 (Court of Appeals England and Wales-2004)

Heter Iska Need Not be Signed Under Halacha | IRR Part IX

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

WHY THE HETER ISKA NEED NOT (AND UNDER US LAW AND PRACTICE SHOULD NOT) BE SIGNED BY PARTIES UNDER THE HALACHA

The concept of a “Shtar”[1] under Halachah is to be distinguished from a contract under New York law.  A contract is a legally binding agreement entered into by the parties thereto where there are mutual expressions of obligation or other consideration in support of the agreement between the parties.  A Shtar, on the other hand, is not  an agreement.[2]  It therefore need not necessarily be signed by the parties.  It does not require consideration.  Indeed, classically it is signed by two witnesses; not the parties.  A Shtar  is an attestation by the two witnesses as to the existence of an agreement and the terms thereof.  The actual agreement between the parties is accomplished by way of a formal act of “Kinyan.”[3]  There are various types of Kinyanim,[4] all of which are intended to symbolize the effectuation of a transaction between the parties.  Classically, under the Halacha, there is no concept of an agreement that can be enforced.  There are only completed transactions.

Thus, a Heter Iska may be properly entered into under Jewish law as described above, but nevertheless not be enforceable as a contract under US law.  On the most basic level, if the parties themselves do not sign and deliver the Heter Iska in accordance with the formalities required under US law then the document does not constitute an enforceable contract under US law.  There may or may not be an enforceable oral agreement depending on the circumstances.  However, a written agreement must be signed by the party charged in order to be binding.  By following this kind of a procedure, (i.e., of complying with Halachah, with witnesses and not the parties executing and delivering the Heter Iska so as not to become a binding written agreement under US law), in effect, the requirements of the Halacha can be complied with, but not US law.  A situation can thereby be avoided which causes the Halacha or US law to be dishonored because of the unfortunate tactics practiced by some borrowers to avoid their obligations.

Given all of the potential issues associated with trying to enforce a document promulgated wholly under Halacha and never intended to be consistent with US law or any other law, it is no wonder that issues of the sort described above have cropped up, from time to time.  This also helps explain why certain banks have adopted the practice of displaying a Heter Iska on the wall, as opposed to signing an individual Heter Iska.  They do not wish to take the risk that the Heter Iska document will be enforced in a manner that was never intended This is because it is virtually impossible to satisfy the evidentiary requirements that are a precondition to the debtor asserting a defense of no profits under the Heter Iska.  This kind of a nuanced tradition has been developed over the centuries.  A secular court, relying on outside religious experts (who are often in dispute) cannot be expected properly to apply the Halacha as intended.  The reliance by secular courts on outside religious experts to explain the intricate details of the Halacha is just not appropriate.  There may also be constitutional infirmities, as discussed below.  The proper forum for enforcing Halacha is a Bet Din, comprised of Halachic expert judges who are well versed in the nuances of this arcane area of law and practice.

    1. II.              THE SHA’ARIAH- SOURCES OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST RIBA.

The Sha’ariah[5] is not a monolithic legal code. The Koran[6] and the Sunnah[7] (upon which the Sha’ariah is said to be derived,) are also not a legal code. Instead of containing precise answers to questions of religious law, they set forth broad guidelines.

In the period since the Koran, Islam did not experience a phase of codification in the development of the Sha’ariah of the sort experienced by the Halacha. There is no Sha’ariah equivalent to the encyclopedic work represented by the Talmud. There are also no codes of law like that compiled by Maimonides or represented by the TUR or Shulchan Aruch.

There is also no comparable body of legislated laws or common law to that in effect in the US. The US has federal, state and local laws that have been legislated and are binding on its citizens. The US also has a body of common law, with established legal precedents, that can be relied upon in courts or other proceedings. Neither of these hallmarks of the US legal system exist in Islam. While, some Sha’ariah scholars have sought to establish some sort of consensus (known as “Ijma”), this has not necessarily been successful in practice. It does not appear that such scholarly positions have actually been accepted as binding by most who profess to be members of the Islamic faith.

There is also no supreme authority that can determine questions of law like the Supreme Court of the US. In this regard, both the Sha’ariah and Halacha suffer from this same disability in modern times. Hence, the many conflicting views of greater or lesser authority or acceptance, that remain unresolved.

The Sha’ariah might fairly be described as a collection of views over the years, from a variety of sources. As noted above, many of them are in conflict. The sources of the views expressed include those of recognized legal authorities such as the Mufti of a particular Islamic state, as well as, those reputable scholars. It also includes the views of self-professed authorities and spokesmen of differing backgrounds, education and authority. All claim to derive their views from the Koran or the Sunnah. However, sometimes the Koranic text quoted in support of a particular position may not be so clear. As noted below, these claims may or may not survive genuine scholarly scrutiny. Indeed, as noted below, self-appointed spokesmen for Islam, such as Osama Bin Laden, apparently can successfully challenge the views of such leading legal authorities as the Mufti of Egypt’s Al Azhar Institute[8]. This is often done in the name of advancing a particular brand of Islam. There is often not even the veneer of a legal or scholarly approach to these pronouncements. As discussed below, just because someone says that the Koran says so doesn’t make it so. Fortunately, extremists, no matter how strident, cannot actually legislate and control how most members of Islam act in practice. Nevertheless, the extremists have caused a great deal of conflict, discussion and debate by established legal authorities.

In this regard it should be noted, that there is a dispute among recognized Sha’ariah authorities as to the very meaning of the term Riba and its application. Yet, there is no supreme authority, recognized by most of Islam that is capable of deciding the matter.

What is a Moslem in a non-Islamic state to do? How is a determination to be made given the lack of a supreme authority? Is everyone to make his or her own personal decision as to which Sha’ariah authority to follow? Are there mitigating circumstances applicable when living in a non-Islamic state? What about those who reside in an Islamic state that purports to apply Sha’ariah law; but, nevertheless permits foreign banks to make loans on interest and its own banks to do so, directly or indirectly, as discussed below? Moreover, which of the conflicting views is right? Absent a supreme Islamic authority recognized by most Moslems, does any Islamic state have the right to decide on its own?

Notwithstanding all the clamor about prohibited Riba and the pedantic distinctions between “interest bearing” instruments vs. “interest based” interments, the reality is that interest or its equivalent is being charged by all manner of banks or other lenders. This includes loans or its equivalent by Moslems to other Moslems. Indeed this has been the case both before Islam, after the inception of Islam and to date.

Is everyone just wrong or is there another interpretation of the Koran? Are there views espoused by religious authorities and scholars that can help explain these practices?

This article suggests that not everyone who charges or pays interest or its equivalent is wrong. But, the fact is many disagree with this proposition. Furthermore, as a practical matter, many Moslems can and do vote with their feet on the issue. Thus, as noted below, many Moslems have bank accounts. Many also borrow from banks using traditional interest bearing loan documents (and not Sha’ariah compliant forms,) because it costs less. In line with the foregoing, HSBC has reportedly closed its Sha’ariah compliant mortgage lending department in London. Consider, why should HSBC or any other bank offer something more expensive and complicated than a traditional mortgage loan when there is no genuine demand for the product. It would appear that Moslem borrowers rightly prefer the simplicity and lower cost of a traditional bank mortgage loan product. They also apparently want to earn interest on their insured bank deposits.

Is right to prohibit these beneficial financial products to Moslems? Is it better to offer Moslems only non-competitive financial products, that are at rates and costs less favorable than prevailing market terms? Is it fair to require Moslems to do so, all in the name of an interpretation of the Koran that may not be justified or appropriate? What about the relevant scholarly views and Fatwas issued by noted Islamic authorities that purport to permit the same, as discussed below; are they just to be ignored?

The answer is not clear. Thus, as discussed below, there appears to be no accepted definition of the word Riba, or of the rules governing the application of the prohibition against Riba, in practice. Instead there are conflicting views of the sort described below and practices accepted by some, but not all, of Islam.


[1]A written document that is signed by witnesses who, in effect, testify as to transaction described in the document.

[2] Traditionally, the Halacha does not recognize the common law concept of an executory agreement (i.e., a contractual obligation to sell or buy property).  Rather, under the Halacha, there are only completed transfers of property effectuated by a Kinyan.  If, however, the buyer does not pay for the property, then the Halacha recognizes that there are various rights and/or remedies, including rescission (see Shulchan Aruch-Yoreh Deah 236:6).  In addition, the Halacha also deems the right to payment of the purchase price as a debt of the buyer, which is secured by a floating lien on the property purchased, as well as on the buyer’s other property.  See Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia at page 49a and also Bava Metzia: 47b (regarding a vendor claim of fraud), as well as, Bava Metzia: 44a (regarding “Mi Shepara”).  See also Bava Metzia: 49a (absent a formal Kinyan, it is all just words).  Moreover, see Bava Batra at page 3a and Shulchan Aruch-Choshen Mishpat 198:1-5.  For a fuller discussion of the matter, see Understanding Rights in Context; Freedom Contract?  A Comparison of the Various Jewish and American Traditions and Michael J. Broyde and Steven S. Wiener (2010); The Metaphysis of Property Interests in Jewish Law, by J. David Bleich (2010); and when Religious Practices become Legal Obligations; Extending the Foreign Compulsion Defense by Michael A. Helfand (Journal of Law and Religion Vol. 23: page 101-2008).

[3] A symbolic method of effectuating a transfer of property.  In modern times, this includes a Kinyan known as “Situmta”.  Rashi describes the origin of the term “Situmta” as the mark made by wine merchants on their barrels to identify them as having been sold (see Rashi on Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia: 74a).  Tosafot (Bava Metzia 66a) explains that Situmta embodies a class of actions, which are recognized by custom as methods of accomplishing a transaction.  This, even though they are not recognized as Kinyanim in the Torah.  Aaron Levine (in The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics) defines Situmta as a mode of acquisition in practice in a particular place.  He concludes that by employing the law of Situmta, Halachic authorities have, in effect, recognized halachically, prevailing modes of acquisition (despite the fact that they are not sourced in the Talmud).  I discussed the matter of modern contract law and practice under the common law with Menachem Elon. I noted to him that there was no such thing as an enforceable executory contract in the Talmud.  Rather, there were only executed transactions (i.e., transfers by way of Kinyan) and, in effect, a debt for the purchase price.  He responded that as a matter of custom (“minhag”) contracts were recognized.  He went on to say the basis of the applicable minhag was “diamonds”.  I responded that diamonds were consignment arrangements not a contract for the sale and purchase of real estate.  He smiled and said that it was nevertheless enforceable as a matter of custom (minhag).

[4] Plural of Kinyan.

[5] Loosely defined as the way or the path. It appears to be similar in meaning to the term Halacha, which may also be loosely defined as the path or the way.

[6] A book attributed to Mohamed that is said to be authored with prophetic inspiration.

[7] The Sunnah are a collection of reports by others of the (i) sayings of Mohamed (“Hadith”) and (ii) actions of Mohamed.

[8] A scholarly institution of authority and position within the Egyptian governmental and religious establishment of Egypt