Tag Archives: Finance

Leonard Grunstein: Bill De Blasio Should Mandate Affordable Housing

Leonard Grunstein gives insight on Mayor-elect Bill de Blasio‘s plan to increase the amount affordable housing in NYC.  While de Blasio’s plan is praiseworthy, Grunstein points out the plan is also creating apprehension within the real estate industry.  Grunstein stresses there is a vital need for more more middle-income housing in NYC, but current efforts offer small incentive to developers to build affordable housing.

“More can be done in terms of zoning bonuses or overrides for these sites to foster the creation of middle-income affordable housing.”

Grunstein goes on to explain that under the Bloomberg administration, their is a lack of focus on the creation of middle-income units and as a result, the city is missing big opportunities:

“If similar requirements had been in place for the massive Hudson Yards development, there would be an additional 5,000 units of affordable housing constructed. The thousands of people who will eventually work in that new neighborhood could have filled these apartments rather than having to commute from long distances.”

That’s an unnecessary burden for those workers as well as a loss for the city’s economy”

Grunstein advises that de Blasio should foster his relationship with the real estate industry; show that he is willing to work with them.  Choosing to mandate construction of middle-income housing would add to the long-term sustainability and vitality of NYC.  Residents of all income levels will not to be forced leave, they can continue to thrive in the city.

“The city should not leave the decision to include affordable housing up to the developer. Instead, it should have required the construction of affordable housing as part of the RFP and guaranteed the creation of a place where middle-income New Yorkers could live.”

Read Leonard Grunstein’s full article on Gotham Gazette

Grunstein Creates Subdivision Plan & Financeable Ground Lease Form | Battery Park City Redevelopment

By the 1950s, the once-prosperous Port of Lower Manhattan had fallen into disrepair following the funneling of sea traffic to Port Elizabeth in New Jersey. In the early 1960s, private businesses, with the support of Mayor Robert Wagner’s administration, proposed landfilling and redevelopment of the area in an effort to revitalize the blighted neighborhood.

In 1966, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, after reaching a compromise with several other groups interested in developing the area, announced the proposal for what is now Battery Park City in a planned community at the southwestern tip of Manhattan.

Two years later, the State Legislature created the Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) to oversee development of the neighborhood, working with the Urban Development Corp. and several other public agencies on the project. In 1972, the landfilling process began, using material from construction sites around the area.

Although developers completed the landfilling by 1976, officials put the project on hold as the city dealt with dire financial problems.

Battery Park City

South Cove | Battery Park City

But in 1978, Mr. Grunstein played a key role in jumpstarting the stalled redevelopment of Lower Manhattan. He helped create the subdivision plan, embodied in the Mapping Agreement he drafted and negotiated, and financeable ground lease form used by the BPCA that enabled redevelopment of the land.

A year later, the City – still grappling with severe financial issues — transferred the title to the land to the BPCA. A new plan, designed in 1979 by the architecture firm Cooper-Eckstut, incorporated the development into the existing infrastructure.

Soon after, redevelopment of Lower Manhattan blossomed. The first residential complex was built in 1980, followed by the completion in 1985 of the World Financial Center – home to the offices of companies such as Merrill Lynch and American Express. Development of the neighborhood continued throughout the 1990s, with the construction of more than 30 residential and commercial buildings.

According to the BPCA, Battery Park City is now home to 17,000 residences, 52 shops and services, 36 acres of green space, 20 works of public art, three schools and two hotels. It is also home to the Irish Hunger Memorial, the Museum of Jewish Heritage, the New York City Police Memorial, the Skyscraper Museum and Poets House.

Heter Iska & U.S. Courts | IRR Part VIII

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

HETER ISKA AND THE US COURTS

The nature and enforceability of a Heter Iska has been the subject of a number of NY court decisions with varying consequences.  This is problematical in a number of respects.  Of primary concern is the fact that these kinds of anomalous and unpredictable results are the bane of lenders and the capital markets.  Furthermore, as shown below, the treatment of a Heter Iska by a US court may be wholly inconsistent with how the very same document would likely be treated under the Halacha.

To better understand the basis for these concerns, it is important to analyze a number of the seminal decisions under New York law in this area, which affected the way banks structure loans involving a Heter Iska.

One of the more important cases in this area of law is IDB v. Weiss & Wolf,[1] a 1985 NY State Supreme Court[2] decision.  In that case, the Court held that a triable issue existed as to whether a Heter Iska defense was available to the borrower.  As a result of this decision, banks no longer typically sign an individual Heter Iska.  Instead, there is the Heter Iska on the wall, as it were.[3]  Its presence on the wall, instead of in an individual loan file, says much about how serious an issue (i.e., the existence of a Heter Iska signed by the lender and borrower) was presented by the decision in the IDB case.  Ever since then the banks have correctly balked at signing a Heter Iska.  While the case is not reported to have gone to final judgment (presumably it settled), it did establish a precedent in practice.  Thus, given that a properly drawn and executed Heter Iska could be enforced by the courts, banks therefore avoided doing so.  The court’s finding that a triable issue existed was sufficient to case a chilling effect on entering into a Heter Iska on an individual basis.  No bank wants to take the chance of having a borrower interpose a defense, which survives a motion for summary judgment, let alone conceivably lose any portion of the principal amount of the loan.

In 1986, the NY Supreme Court faced another case involving a Heter Iska in Bank Leumi Trust Company of New York v. Morris Spitzer.[4]  In that case, the Court found that Spitzer did not know about the Bank’s Heter Iska, even though it was displayed on the wall, until well after the loan was made.  The Court in the Leumi case granted summary judgment for the benefit of the bank (unlike in the IDB case).  This is because, among other things, the borrower did not rely on the Heter Iska when he entered into the loan.  Indeed, the borrower didn’t even have a copy of the Heter Iska.  Moreover, the US Bank Leumi subsidiary of the Israeli parent bank did not ratify or sign the Israeli parent’s Heter Iska document.  Neither did the borrower (Spitzer) sign a Heter Iska.  The Court found that the bank had never executed and delivered the Heter Iska to the borrower, even though there was a form that was hung on the wall.  On the other hand, the Court found there was a promissory note, which was signed and delivered by the borrower under US law.  The Court weighed this against an unsigned Heter Iska, which the borrower was not even aware of and the bank had disavowed.  The Court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the bank.  It found that a loan transaction existed, not a Heter Iska relationship.

There have been a number of other unique and interesting cases involving a Heter Iska.  In Bollag v. Dresdner,[5] a civil court case in 1985, the lender sought to use a Heter Iska as a sword instead of a shield.  Thus, the lender sought to collect a usurious rate of interest (in excess of 24% per annum) arguing that the arrangement was truly a profit sharing deal.  The civil court held that substance controlled over form.  It found that notwithstanding the Heter Iska, the arrangement was in fact a loan, which was subject to state usury laws.  The prohibition against usury (excessive interest) could not be avoided by styling the loan as a Heter Iska relationship.

In Heimbinder v. Berkowitz,[6] the lender tried to use the Heter Iska document to assert  personal liability against the shareholder in the corporate borrower, where none existed under US law.  In that case, the borrower was a corporation, notwithstanding that the Heter Iska document was signed by the individual principals.  The court found that the Heter Iska could not change a corporate loan into a personal loan.[7]

Arnav Industries, Inc. v. Westside Realty Associates, et al[8] involved a mortgagee, which sought to foreclose on its mortgage.  The lower court denied summary judgment.  It focused on the insertion of a Hebrew phrase in the mortgage, to wit: “al pi Heter Iska” (in accordance with a Heter Iska)[9] above the signature on the mortgage note and found that there was an issue of fact as to whether it created a partnership agreement between the lender and borrower.  The Appellate Division disagreed and reversed the lower court decision.  It held that the language could not be used by the borrower to vary the terms of the mortgage note.  Among other things, there was no actual Heter Iska signed by the parties.  The note also contained a provision to the effect that nothing contained therein was intended to create a joint venture or partnership.

The Appellate Division in Arnav also cited its own decision in Barclay Commerce Corp. v. Finkelstein.[10]  In the Barclay case, the Appellate Division noted that the Heter Iska constituted “merely a compliance in form…with Hebraic Law.”[11]  It held a partnership is not created thereby and the issue is devoid of merit.  A similar decision was made by the Federal District Court for Massachusetts in Edelkind, et al v. Fairmont Funding, Ltd., et al.[12]

The Appellate Division in LZG Realty LLC, et  al v. HDW, et  al[13] also dealt with an action for foreclosure of a mortgage.  The defendant borrower failed to raise the matter of a Heter Iska and the binding rabbinical arbitration clause thereunder until 1½ years into the matter.  The court held that it was too late to raise the issue at that point in the case.  The court therefore did not reach the underlying issue of the Heter Iska in the case.

In Koenig v. Middlebury Land Associates, LLC, et al,[14] the court dealt with a Heter Iska that had a rabbinical arbitration clause.  The court found, however, that it was not a binding arbitration clause.

The US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York In Re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., Debtor (and In Re David Schick et al Debtors)[15]  ruled that the Heter Iska could not be used as a means to collect a usurious rate of interest of 27% interest per annum.

A recent noteworthy lower court opinion in the NY Supreme Court of Nassau County (dated January 11, 2012) involved the foreclosure of a mortgage.  The name of the case is VNB New York Corp v. 47 Lynbrook LLC, et al (Index # 018467/2010).  In case the mortgage made reference to the fact that to ensure compliance with Jewish law, the Bank has entered into a Heter Iska.  The defendants sought to amend their answer to interpose a defense against a deficiency judgment based on the Heter Iska.  The court noted that the note and mortgage made it clear that applicable civil law (i.e., NY law) was to govern.  Accordingly, the court found that the existence of the Heter Iska did not alter the clear intent of the parties that NY law governs the enforcement of the mortgage documents.  The Heter Iska was not ground for overturning the foreclosure judgment nor could the defendants defend against a corresponding deficiency judgment based thereon.


[1] NY State Supreme Court-1984, NYLJ 2/4/85 at page 14.

[2] The court of original jurisdiction in New York. This as distinguished from the US Supreme Court, the highest court of the land. The highest court in New York State is the Court of Appeals.

[3] It is said that when Rav Moshe Feinstein visited an American-Israeli bank, he noticed that there was a framed Heter Iska on the wall.  He is reputed to have said “Kiknah de Heter Iska oif de Vant” (see the Heter Iska on the Wall).

[4] Unreported decision dated 9/18/86 by Judge Leonard N. Cohen in NY Supreme Court New York County under Index # 017734/1986.

[5] 130 Misc.2nd 221, 495 NYS2nd 560 (NY Civ. Ct. Kings County-1985).

[6] 175 Misc.2nd 808, 670 NYS2nd 301 (S. Ct. Kings County-1998).

[8] 180 AD2d 463, 579 NYS2d 382 (App Div 1rst Dept.-1992).

[9] An example of this kind of a text may be viewed online at sec.edgar-online.com regarding Allou 10-k annual report (dated 6/30/97)- Exhibit B: Section 1 (iii). The Exhibit is an Amendment to the Guaranty, which adds the following provision to Section 15 of the Guaranty: “Heter Iska: This Guaranty is being provided to BLT in accordance with BLT’s Heter Iska.” BLT is a reference to Bank Leumi Trust Company of NY.

[10] 11 AD2nd 325, 205 NYS2nd 551 (App Div 1rst Dept-1960). See also Leibovic v. Rawicki 64 Misc2nd 858, 316 NYS2nd 181 (NY Sup-App Term-1969).

[11] Ibid at page 328

[12] 539 F. Supp. 2d 449 (2007)

[13] 71 AD3rd 642 (App Div-Second Dept.-2010)

[14] 2008 Conn. Super. Lexis 1816 (July 23,2008)

[15] 245 B.R. 460 (2000) aff’d 282 F3rd 185 (2d Cir. NY-2002)

Origin of “Iska”, Theme in Talmud | IRR Part IV

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM ISKA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEME IN THE TALMUD

In dealing with the issue of how to source capital for use in a business venture without falling astray of the strictures against Ribit, the Talmud discusses using the business vehicle then commonly known as an “Iska”.[1]

The Talmud begins its analysis of the topic as follows:  “The Nehardeans[2] said this Iska.”  The discussion of an Iska relationship appears in the context of a prior analysis of a number of other types of business relationships (such as a sharecropper or lease of a field).

The Talmud digresses at this point in the text to discuss a non-real estate business relationship based on what was then commonly known as an Iska.  It notes that a key element in the Iska relationship is that one party (referred to in the Talmud as the “lender” but sometimes otherwise referred to as the “investor”) has capital or assets (i.e., money or goods).  The other party (referred to in the Talmud as the “borrower” but sometimes otherwise referred to as the “working party” or “managing member”) has sweat, talent and/or contacts and a willingness to devote the same to effectuate the purposes of the Iska.  It is the borrower who is actually to conduct the business of the venture.  The lender has no active role other than providing the money for the Iska venture.

It is important to recognize that the Iska relationship is not a partnership or joint venture.  It is just what the Talmud says it is – an Iska.  The Iska format is to be distinguished from all manner of other relationships.  It is a unique business structure.  Much like a limited liability company and limited partnership are two distinct statutory vehicles, which have certain elements in common and others that are dissimilar; so too an Iska.  Thus, an Iska relationship may be analogous in certain respects to a partnership, but it is at its very essence a lending vehicle.  It is to be distinguished in a number of important ways from a partnership,[3] as outlined below.  The Iska vehicle has its own set of rules.  The Talmud describes the structure used at the time and adapts it to the lender/borrower relationship because of its utility.

It would appear that the origin of the term “Iska” predates the Talmud.  Indeed the Talmud invokes the term as an existing business structure in use at the time.  I have researched the term to determine its origin.  In this regard, I searched various texts in a number of different languages in antiquity in an effort to fix the original use of the term.

The word Iska appears to be one in use in ancient Assyrian.  The particular usage identified below was one in cuneiform on a piece of clay.  It is described[4] as the  “ISKA-LARIM”.  The word “Larim” is said to be a proper noun; the name of an individual, Larim.  The term “Iska”, as used in that context, is defined as an agent or “one in control or possession” of some goods.  As I understand the circumstances, Larim was the manager of a caravan.  He entered into an arrangement, known as an Iska, whereby he was given goods or produce by the owner at the source location.  The purpose was to sell the goods or produce in a destination location. where the prevailing market price was more advantageous.  In this particular Iska, Larim, the manager of the caravan, was to transport the goods or produce and sell them at the destination.  The sales proceeds were to be applied first to pay for the original principal amount of the goods or produce.  The profits earned were then to be split between the caravan manager and the original provider of the goods or produce.  The clay text noted above was an accounting by Larim, the caravan manager, to his Iska compatriot.

This appears to be the Iska structure that the Talmud adapted to the lender/borrower context.  Thus whether it was money or food, the lender (capital source), in effect, loaned the same to the borrower (operator of the Iska).  The borrower was entrusted with the money or goods in the business venture to make a profit.  Upon sale of the goods (i.e., loaned to the venture or purchased with the money loaned to the venture), the profits were then divided up (after repayment of the principal amount to the lender).  Questions of liability for the principal amount at risk were handled by contract, within the context of the overall Iska business structure.

In the Talmudic Iska, the money or goods provided are characterized as one-half loan and one-half investment.  The terms used are “palga milvah” (loan) and “palga pikadon” (investment).  The difference conceptually between a loan and an investment is critical to the understanding of this business vehicle.

In general, when one individual lends another individual money or other assets, there is no right to earn interest or, better said, it violates the Biblical commandment against doing so.  Remember in the Biblical context; one individual lends to another individual a thing of intrinsic value.  Precision is required; because other constructs might not be Biblically proscribed and may not even violate rabbinical enactments, under certain circumstances, as described below.

Getting back to the Talmud’s formulation of the Iska relationship, the portion of the money that is deemed to be a loan must be repaid to the lender even if the business venture fails.  As to the investment portion, in general, there is no right of the lender to receive a return of the capital invested if the venture fails.  Any profits derived from the venture that was funded by the lender (i.e., both the loan part and the investment part) are to be shared by both the lender and the borrower, as the owners of the Iska business venture.

In the example given in the Talmud, the lender supplies merchandise to the borrower.  As Rashi points out, the lender must bear some risk of loss. This is the key to understanding the difference between a loan and an investment.  Thus, as to a loan, the borrower bears the risk of loss, if the principal (or goods purchased with the loan) are lost at sea, in a fire or by reason of other casualty.  However, in an Iska, as to the portion that is an investment, it is the lender who bears the risk of loss.  Unless the lender bears some level of risk of loss as prescribed by the Halacha, in substance, the transaction is nothing more than a loan and is subject to the prohibition against Ribit.

Rashi then notes that the borrower has certain duties with respect to the investment portion.[5]  Moreover, those duties extend even to the loan part (not just the investment part), as more fully discussed below.  This is a novel feature of the Talmudic Iska structure.

The transaction described in the Talmud, which was the underlying premise for entering into the Iska relationship, was motivated by a business opportunity.  The value of the goods in one place (where the borrower and lender entered into the Iska relationship) was less than the value in another location.  To take advantage of this arbitrage opportunity, the borrower is to travel to the agreed upon destination with the goods and sell them there.  As an aside, so as to avoid any stricture against Ribit, the borrower is to be paid appropriate compensation for the work the borrower performs as the managing member under the Iska.[6]  In this manner, the efforts expended by the borrower as the working party are not deemed to be Ribit.

The Talmud then comments that the Iska structure as adapted by the Rabbis was good for the borrower and good for the lender.  Notice the language.  The Talmud uses terms that are consistent with a loan, not terms such as “partners” or “investor and “managing member”, which are characteristic of a partnership relationship.  This is because the underlying nature of the parties to the relationship is that of a borrower and lender.  Under the Iska structure, the lender benefits because all of the money furnished to the borrower must be used to generate a profit in the venture.  In addition, the borrower is personally liable for the return of one-half the principal amount furnished.  The borrower similarly benefits because all of the funds needed by the borrower are provided by the lender and the borrower is personally liable for only half of the principal amount.  Given the risks involved in this kind of a transaction, the Talmud concludes that the Iska structure is comforting to both parties.[7]

The Talmud then continues with a discussion by Rava[8] as to the reason why the term Iska is used to describe the goods that are the object of the venture.[9]  He posits a comparison of the term “Iska” with another word, “Easuki,” which in Hebrew is spelled similarly.  The term “Easuki” means for use in business.  Hence, the use of the term Iska to describe the goods loaned (or acquired with the money loaned) for use in the business.

Rava posits[10] that the capital invested in the Iska relationship is for use in the business venture only; not for personal use.  This is another fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of the Iska.  A loan is a personal matter, both in terms of obligation and use.  The borrower does not have to use the proceeds of a loan for any particular purpose.  This is so even if the loan was taken for the sole purpose of using the proceeds in a business to generate profits.  Thus, as the Talmud notes,[11] although the borrower can even drink beer with the proceeds of the loan, generally, (despite the fact that it was characterized as a business loan and not a personal one; or, give the loan proceeds to the borrower’s children as an inheritance), this is not the case with a Iska, where all the proceeds (including the one-half loan portion) must be used in the Iska venture for the intended purpose of generating a profit.

This is not the case with an Iska type loan, as noted above.  Thus, the Talmud rules that the Iska structure mandates use of the entire principal amount (both the investment and the loan portions) furnished in the business venture for the intended business purposes (and for no other purposes).  This in order to fulfill the businesses purposes of the venture (i.e., to earn a profit).

Rashi[12] points out the motivation behind this important and essential condition of the Iska.  He finds that the borrower seeking to profit on his share will therefore earn a profit on the entirety of the principal amount funded by the lender (i.e., both the loan portion and the investment portion).

In line with the foregoing, Rava holds unlike an ordinary loan, which is collectible only as against the real property of the debtor’s estate, in the case of an Iska, the lender can also collect against the merchandise (i.e., personal property) in the Iska relationship.  Moreover, if the debtor were alive at the time, the debtor’s obligation in an Iska relationship may be enforced against all of the debtor’s property, both moveable and real property.


[1] Tractate Bava Metzia- Chapter 9 ( Hamekabel) on page 104b.

[2] Talmudic scholars from the Town of Nehardea  (i.e. in the area of Bavel) outside of the Land of Israel.

[3] The reference to other comparable structures is as a convenience only, so as to better understand the unique nature of the vehicle.

[4] In the Proceeding of XLV Recontre Assyriologique Internationale (books.google.com)by Tzvi Abusch, Carol Noyes and William Halo (2001) at page 171.

[5] This concept was further developed in the Heter Iska structure  and the effect was to shift all of the risk of loss to the borrower as a practical matter.

[6] Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia at page 68b, where it states that any amount agreed to whether much or little is sufficient. It should be noted however, that Rav Shimon ben Yochai dissents and requires that the full measure of appropriate wages must be paid.

[7] The Talmudic passage cited notes the Iska is beneficial to both parties as noted above.

[8] One of the preeminent Amoras (i.e. Halachic spokesman) in the Talmudic era.

[9] It is the goods themselves and not the venture that is being discussed in terms of the name Iska. Under the Assyrian definition it is the agent who is referred to as the Iska, as noted below.

[10] See in the cited portion of the Talmud noted above

[11] Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia at page 104b.

[12] The Rashi commentary on the passage of the Talmud cited above is printed on the same page of the Talmud alongside the cited text.

Theory vs Practice | IRR Part III

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE – IS THERE A GENUINE PROHIBITION IN OUR TIMES?

It would appear that the extremely onerous prohibitions against interest have seemingly been circumvented in practice over the last few thousand years; virtually from the very inception of the prohibition in the Bible, by all three major Religions (Christian, Moslem and Jewish).  They all proclaim to live by the terms and conditions of the Bible.  They all derive their ethical, religious and legal systems from the very same Bible.  Yet all three have found a way to charge interest in practice, despite what appears to be an express prohibition against charging or paying interest.

Rabbi Baruch Halevi Epstein[1] (author of the seminal work on the Bible known as the Torah Temimah[2]) took up the issue in another of his commentaries on the Bible known as, the Tosafot Bracha.[3]  In commenting on the prohibition of Ribit, he noted the world of the exile was very different from that of ancient Biblical Israel.  When the Jewish people lived in the Land of Israel, they functioned within the context of an agrarian economy.  Rabbi Epstein went on to say that in his time, the only occupation available to observant Jews, as a practical matter, was in trade or money lending.  They were not landed gentry, as in days of yore.

Rabbi Epstein analyzed the economy of his day and found that a money lending or banking system[4] was a structural requirement for business and trade to function properly.  Much like the comment made by Rabbi Aaron Solevetchik[5] noted below, the modern economy couldn’t function without banks being available and loaning money.  As we all witnessed recently, a breakdown in the banking system can paralyze the economy generally.  Rabbi Epstein points out, that absent these opportunities to do business, the Jewish people would be without the means to support themselves in the exile.

This is unlike the Biblical economy.  As Rabbi Epstein pointed out, Biblical Israel was a society where owning land, devoted to growing wheat and other foodstuffs, was critical to subsistence.  In that kind of an agrarian economy, there was no real need for money.  As a nation of landowners, inheritance of land and keeping it in the family was a pre-requisite to success.  The wealth was in the land.  Rabbi Epstein points out that those with a surplus might as well loan it without interest to their brethren as a good deed.  This is because there was little else that could be done with surplus money in a subsistence economy.  Indeed, if anyone needed money it was because they were destitute.  They could hardly be expected to pay interest; they might not even be able to repay the principal.  The charging of interest in that kind of a situation is therefore “Neshech” (biting).

In our times, it is often the borrower who prefers to pay a fixed charge for money, instead of making the lender a partner.  The unlimited return potential is reserved to the borrower/entrepreneur.  The lender may want to be a partner, but the borrower is just as likely, or more likely, to insist that only interest be paid for the money, not a profit share.

Today’s world economy is about business and trade.  Money is the lifeblood of the economy.  Land may still have some value for agricultural use, but its highest and best use is usually non-agricultural.  Often, real estate is best used as part of a trade or business.  Commerce (and hence money) is the source of prosperity and in substance the only real source of income (and therefore sustenance) for the Jewish people.

Rabbi Epstein finds that the Heter Iska was the mechanism that the Rabbis enacted to permit businesses to borrow needed capital so as to enable the businesses to function.  He goes on to posit that the Bible itself implicitly provides the basis for the Heter Iska exception.  The Rabbis did not want to undermine the authority of the Bible, generally, by just excising this express prohibition.  Therefore, according to Rabbi Epstein, the Rabbis enacted a mechanism for avoiding the prohibition, as a matter of form, consistent with the philosophy underlying the religious principle of providing money to those in need.[6]

There are similar philosophical underpinnings to the Sha’ariah compliant financing mechanisms noted below.  They similarly provide a mechanism to avoid the prohibition against Riba, as a matter of form, consistent with the philosophy underlying religious principle of providing money to those in need on the most favorable terms.


[1] A Halachic authority of the early 20th century.

[2] A commentary on the Bible that cites to texts in the Talmud, which discuss the particular verse in the Bible.

[3] Leviticus: Chapter 25-Verse 36

[4] Rav Epstein uses the term “Ezrat Kessafim” to describe the banking or money lending function that is an integral and vital element of commerce and trade. Otherwise, as he notes, business cannot “take hold”.

[5] A 20th century Halachic authority. He is the brother of another eminent Halachic authority, Rav Yoshe Baer Solevetchik. Both were also leading professors of Talmud at Yeshiva University.

[6] Lo Tinayl Delet,..(literally, don’t close the door on borrowers) as quoted in the Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia at page 68b. (See also Talmud Tractate Sanhedrin at page 3a.) This concept is also used as the basis for other enactments like Prosbul (a mechanism whereby the biblical requirement that debts be forgiven every 7 years is avoided) that appear, at first blush, to prejudice the borrower; but, in reality enable the borrower to obtain funding. (See Talmud Tractate Gittin at page 36b.)