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Analysis of Prohibition Against Riba in Practice & Rules | IRR Part XI

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST RIBA AND ITS APPLICATION IN PRACTICE, INCLUDING WHETHER ENTITIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RULES AS INDIVIDUALS

It is respectfully suggested that not all interest is prohibited Riba and not all Riba is interest[1].

Consider for example the 16th century Ottoman Cash Waqfs[2]. They were permitted to charge interest. A Waqf[3] was viewed as a separate legal entity (as distinguished from the individuals who invested or operated the same). There is also a Fatwa[4] issued by Ebusud Effendi, the 16th century Mufti of Istambul that expressly determined that a Waqf and Charitable Trust could charge borrowers interest and pay interest to the providers of capital to the entities. Many a 16th century effendi made profit this way. The use of an entity as an intermediary shielded both the debtor paying interest to the entity and those providing capital to the entity and thereby earning interest from the prohibition against Riba. The interest had to be fair in theory. Indeed Cash Waqfs were said to be formed to help borrowers, who were otherwise paying excessive rates of interest.

Yahia Abdul-Raman[5], relying on the Fatwa of Baraka[6]reports that the term interest can be used in documents to satisfy local legal requirements, so long as Riba was not practiced in the transaction. The Fatwa itself states that there is no objection to using the term interest as an alternative to profit or rate of return. Hence it is possible to have a parallel set of documents with the term interest being used as appropriate to satisfy capital markets requirements, so long as Riba is not practiced. However, just what is or is not Riba was not defined.

Al Baraka Bank in London devised a structure for interest bearing loan documents to be imbedded in the transactional documents that are otherwise Sha’ariah compliant. This was done in an attempt to thereby achieve satisfaction of the requirements of the capital markets, without falling astray of the Sha’ariah. Thus, it employs a Mushraka[7] framework, where under the Bank and borrower initially buy the home to be financed as a joint venture; but the Bank retains title to the property, as described below. The Bank then sells its interest to the borrower at a mark up that reflects the interest factor it charges. Ownership of the property however remains with the Bank until the purchase price is paid in full (i.e.: the principal and interest factor that comprises the mark up). However, consistent with UK law, the Bank also takes a mortgage lien against the property. The borrower enters into a lease with the Bank of the property, where under the borrower rents the property from the Bank at a rental rate equivalent to the monthly interest and amortization payments that would ordinarily be charged (albeit at a higher rate of interest that the prevailing rates for a traditional mortgage loan). In essence it is viewed as an installment sales contract under the Sha’ariah and a mortgage loan that is interest bearing under UK law.

The concept of having a separate set of traditional interest bearing loan documents could be very useful, if properly structured. A good example of how this can be successfully accomplished is noted above in the discussion of the use of a Heter Iska. Just embedding a set of traditional loan documents in a Shariah complaint structure may not be the appropriate solution. On the other hand, if properly structured, then conceptually it can be adapted to meet the requirements of the capital markets, as well as, US legal requirements. Indeed, courts in the UK dealing with a Murabaha[8] structured product with parallel interest bearing note and mortgage held that under English law the interest earning note prevailed[9].

However, as more fully discussed below, just embedding a set of more traditional loan documents in a structure that is inconsistent with capital markets and likely Sha’ariah requirements may not be advisable, for the reasons set forth below. Consider the inconsistent expectations. The bank hopes the documents will be interpreted in favor of the traditional loan documents embedded in the structure so as to have an ordinary interest bearing loan obligation that is secured by a priority first mortgage on the property. On the other hand, the borrower desires that the transaction be Sha’ariah compliant and not be viewed as an interest bearing obligation that is likely prohibited Riba according to many Sha’ariah scholars and others. The courts or other juridical authorities in the US and in the Islamic world may have conflicting views as to how to interpret and enforce the various documents encompassing the transaction between the bank and borrower. There is a need for clarity and predictability and yet it is conspicuously absent, as described in this article. As noted below in the discussion of modern Sukuk structures, these issues have been put into focus with unintended and less than desirable results.

Sukuk bond structures are very interesting. Instead of being asset based (i.e.: with a security interest in the assets or mortgage on real estate) they are said to be asset backed (i.e.: the lender actually owns the assets). However, as discussed below this is not always so clear. Typically, an Ijara[10] rental structure is then employed, if the underlying collateral is real estate. It provides for a rental arrangement with the borrower under a lease of the property, with the rental being tied to the yield agreed to with the lender. As noted below there is no thought given to providing for a genuine market rent, it is just a derivative interest based financial arrangement.

However, as more fully discussed below, many such Sukuk structures also provide for a set of loan documents to be embedded in the transactional structure. These are not exactly typical mortgage loan documents that are compliant with capital markets requirements. They may in fact be a vain effort to mimic those kind of loan documents; but, as noted below, the path taken is anything but traditional from a capital markets’ prospective. For example, instead of providing for a first priority mortgage securing an interest bearing note, it provides for a putative mortgage lien securing a buy-sell arrangement between the borrower and lender. This is more like a preferred equity structures that mimics equity. Indeed, depending on the vagaries of the forum dealing with the matter, it might be interpreted as an equitable loan between the lender and borrower or it might be viewed as just plain equity. The buy-sell arrangement is another way of saying the preferred equity must be repaid. It purports to convert what looks like equity into a loan. However, even if that is the case, it is on a subordinated basis; rather than on a priority basis of the sort represented by a first mortgage against the property. There are real risks associated with this kind of arrangement, both structural and from a bankruptcy point of view, as discussed below[11].

Abu Hanifa[12] was one of the greatest known Imams in history.  He issued a Fatwa[13] (commonly known as the Hanifa Fatwa) ruling that there was no prohibition against charging Riba in a foreign land (i.e.: a country not under Islamic sovereignty and control and where Islamic law is not the law of the land). The Fatwa of Sha Abdul Aziz of India goes even further and just flat out permits Muslims to lend non-Muslims on interest[14].

It would appear that some Sha’ariah scholars have adopted the position that whether a Waqf, government treasury or bank, a legal person (i.e.: entity, as opposed to an individual) is not subject to the prohibition against Riba (when it pays or charges interest). This includes the scholarly work done by the Mufti of and various Sha’ariah legal authorities at the Al-Azhar University in Egypt. For example, Dr. Muhammad Shanqri al-Fanjar of Al-Azhar asserts that bank interest is not Riba. He views the blanket equation of Riba and interest as something to be avoided.[15]

Similarly, as noted above, Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the Grand Mufti of Egypt and a leader of Al-Azhar, held that government bond interest is not Riba[16]. Dr. Tantawi viewed government bond interest as, in essence, a sharing arrangement in the government’s profits.

Dr. Tantawi also issued a Fatwa on December 2, 2002, in which he held, in effect, that bank interest is permitted, as more fully discussed below. In his Fatwa, Dr. Tantawi noted that it is well known banks fix the pre-specified return to depositors (i.e.: interest rate on deposits) after a detailed study of the international and domestic market conditions and the economic circumstances in society. This, as well as, the special conditions and nature of each transaction and the average profitability thereof are also considered by the bank in setting the pre-specified return (i.e.: interest rates) payable to depositors. He summarizes his position in the Fatwa as follows:

“In summary, pre-specification of profits for those who invest their funds through an investment agency with banks or other institutions is legally permissible, and above legal suspicion (la shubhat fiha). This transaction belongs to the domain of benefits that were neither explicitly permitted nor explicitly forbidden (min qabil al-masalih al-mursalah), and does not belong to the domain of creeds or formal acts of worship, wherein change and alteration is not allowed.

Based on what has been stated [we rule that] investing funds with banks that pre-specify profits or returns is legally permissible and there is no harm therein, and Allah [only] knows best.”

Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut Grand Imam of Al-Azhar ruled that post office savings interest and state bond interest was not prohibited Riba[17]. He reasoned that a pre-fixed share of the profits (which is equivalent to an interest rate) is not prohibited Riba, if offered by the State or an affiliate thereof. He goes on to say that there is no exploitation of either party in this kind of arrangement[18]. This concept is a dramatic breakthrough in thinking by Sha’ariah scholars. It laid the groundwork for the  even more dramatic Fatwa by Dr. Tantawi[19] noted above.

These eminent Sha’ariah authorities ruled that banks can, in effect, pay interest to depositors, in the form of pre-specifying the profits or return as a percentage of the amount deposited by the customer (i.e. interest in common parlance). It is not a percentage of the actual profits of the bank, In essence, just don’t use the term interest expressly and it’s permitted. Whether it’s a prefixed share of profits as a percentage of the principal amount invested or some other analogous formulation for interest, form appears to govern over substance.  Thus, the concept of “interest based” products being permitted as opposed to “interest bearing” products. Dr. Tantawi goes on to explain that the pre-fixing of profits benefits the depositor in this age of corruption, dishonesty and greed. He goes on to say that just as profits may be shared by two parties, so too can the parties agree that one would receive a pre-specified share of profits.[20] Tantawi rules that this concept does not contradict the Koran or the Sunnah. It benefits both parties and forbidding it would result in harm[21].

Others have found that the use of the term interest does not in and of itself violate the prohibition against Riba. Thus, Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Al-Quaradawi and others issued a Fatwa in October 1990, ruling that it is possible to use the term interest, instead of the term profit or rate of return, in order to benefit from the financial advantages granted by the relevant authorities in the West with regard to deposits and financings. This would include using the term interest in tax declarations or the documents used by the bank in various financings. It is respectfully suggested that this Fatwa recognizes the need for a parallel set of loan documents so as to better access the capital markets. At the same time, there would also be a Sha’ariah compliant structure and set of documents, so as not to fall astray of the requirements of the Sha’ariah. This concept is more fully discussed below. It is also helps support the proposed solution set forth in Section XVIII below.

Notwithstanding these well reasoned, expedient and useful Fatwas and scholarly approaches described above, that are sensitive to the realities of the marketplace and the human condition and provide a nuanced and practical approach to dealing with the issues, there are conflicting views. Some have scholarly pretensions but many are pronouncements made by the more nationalistic side of Islam. They do not seek to live side by side with non-Moslems or integrate. Rather, it would appear they want to conquer and impose their own brand of Islam on others. One such harsh critic of Islamic banking (including the Sha’ariah compliant forms they have adopted) was Osama Bin Laden. He was the notorious head of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda until his demise. Among other dastardly acts, he was responsible for the 9/11 bombing of the World Trade Center and the thousands of deaths of innocent souls in New York City. In a rambling so called Fatwa he published[22], declaring war against the US, he included a statement to the effect that the banks in Saudi Arabia violated the prohibition against Riba. There was no discussion of the Sha’ariah or analysis of just how this was so, in theory or in practice.  It was just one of many baseless pronouncements he made in his so called Fatwa. Interestingly, notwithstanding his pronouncements, even Osama bin Laden reportedly had a bank account.

However, even as these extremist views are being forcefully expressed, interest or its equivalent is being charged and paid by Moslems in Islamic and non-Islamic jurisdictions. Described below are some of the so-called Sha’ariah compliant structures.


[1] See An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence by Dr. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal (2001) in the Proceedings of the Third Harvard University Forum of Islamic Finance.

[2] Supra footnote 183 at page 6. Of Article by Dr. Farooq, noted therein. See also An Analytical Review of Different Concepts of Riba (Interest) in the Sub-Continent by Farooz Azizi, Muhammed Mahmud and Emad u Karin in Kasbit Business Journal 1 (1): 36-43  (Fall 2008)., that asserts that Riba is compound interest (i.e.: usury) and that it is extreme exploitation that is restricted by the Koran. It goes on to state that borrowing for trading purposes on interest and Bank interest is not prohibited Riba.

[3] a religious or other foundation.

[4] Supra Footnote 183, at page 10 of Article by Dr. Farooq, which cites the Fatwa of Ebusud Efendi, a 16th century Mufti of Istambul, permitting a Waqf to charge interest. See also discussion by Timur Kuran,  supra footnote 162, at pages 7-8. See further discussion by Dr. El-Gamal,, supra footnote 176, at page 109. Finally, see The Concept of Artificial Legal Entity and Limited Liability Company by Mahmoud M. Sanusi in Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Finance and Takaaful, beginning at page 192, et seq.

[5] A founder of the American Finance House-LARIBA.  Parenthetically, the term LARIBA can be loosely defined as no Riba.

[6] Reported in The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance at Page 213.

[7] See discussion below regarding this type of Sha’ariah compliant financing structure.

[8] As defined below.

[9] See, for example, the Beximco  UK case described in Section XII below.

[10] As defined below.

[11] See The Logic of Financial Westernization in the Middle East by Timur Kuran in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol, 56 (2005) beginning at page 553.

[12] A 7th century Islamic religious legal authority and Imam.

[13] See Masri and Keller (1997)- Reliance of the Traveler: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law Umdat Al- Salik at page 944. See also Dr. Salah al Sawi, A Polite Reconsideration of the Fatwa Permitting Interest-Based Mortgages for Buying Homes in Western Society-2001 (www. Islamic-Finance.com), which argues that the Hanafi Fatwa should be limited to circumstances of necessity, only, where there is no other possible alternative.

[14] Supra Footnote 187, at page 38.

[15]Supra footnote 183, at page 25 of Dr. Farooq’s article.

[16] Ibid at page 17 of Dr. Farooq’s article.

[17] Ibid at page 16 of Dr, Farooq’s article.

[18] Ibid

[19] Chibli Mallat, Tantawi on Banking Operations in Egypt in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Mufti and their Fatwas at page 286 (1996). See also Fatwa of Ibn Baz ( Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz),Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia,  Ruling 137 in Volume 19 beginning at page 240, in opposition to Tantawi’s  view.

[20] Ibid at page 118.

[21] Ibid at page 119.

[22]  Dated August 23, 1996 and reproduced by PBS Newshour Online (at www.pbs.org/newshour terrorism/bin laden fatwa 1996…html).

The Sha’ariah, Prohibition Against & Analysis of Riba | IRR Part X

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

THE SHA’ARIAH- SOURCES OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST RIBA

The Sha’ariah[1] is not a monolithic legal code. The Koran[2] and the Sunnah[3] (upon which the Sha’ariah is said to be derived,) are also not a legal code. Instead of containing precise answers to questions of religious law, they set forth broad guidelines.

In the period since the Koran, Islam did not experience a phase of codification in the development of the Sha’ariah of the sort experienced by the Halacha. There is no Sha’ariah equivalent to the encyclopedic work represented by the Talmud. There are also no codes of law like that compiled by Maimonides or represented by the TUR or Shulchan Aruch.

There is also no comparable body of legislated laws or common law to that in effect in the US. The US has federal, state and local laws that have been legislated and are binding on its citizens. The US also has a body of common law, with established legal precedents, that can be relied upon in courts or other proceedings. Neither of these hallmarks of the US legal system exist in Islam. While, some Sha’ariah scholars have sought to establish some sort of consensus (known as “Ijma”), this has not necessarily been successful in practice. It does not appear that such scholarly positions have actually been accepted as binding by most who profess to be members of the Islamic faith.

There is also no supreme authority that can determine questions of law like the Supreme Court of the US. In this regard, both the Sha’ariah and Halacha suffer from this same disability in modern times. Hence, the many conflicting views of greater or lesser authority or acceptance, that remain unresolved.

The Sha’ariah might fairly be described as a collection of views over the years, from a variety of sources. As noted above, many of them are in conflict. The sources of the views expressed include those of recognized legal authorities such as the Mufti of a particular Islamic state, as well as, those reputable scholars. It also includes the views of self-professed authorities and spokesmen of differing backgrounds, education and authority. All claim to derive their views from the Koran or the Sunnah. However, sometimes the Koranic text quoted in support of a particular position may not be so clear. As noted below, these claims may or may not survive genuine scholarly scrutiny. Indeed, as noted below, self-appointed spokesmen for Islam, such as Osama Bin Laden, apparently can successfully challenge the views of such leading legal authorities as the Mufti of Egypt’s Al Azhar Institute[4]. This is often done in the name of advancing a particular brand of Islam. There is often not even the veneer of a legal or scholarly approach to these pronouncements. As discussed below, just because someone says that the Koran says so doesn’t make it so. Fortunately, extremists, no matter how strident, cannot actually legislate and control how most members of Islam act in practice. Nevertheless, the extremists have caused a great deal of conflict, discussion and debate by established legal authorities.

In this regard it should be noted, that there is a dispute among recognized Sha’ariah authorities as to the very meaning of the term Riba and its application. Yet, there is no supreme authority, recognized by most of Islam that is capable of deciding the matter.

What is a Moslem in a non-Islamic state to do? How is a determination to be made given the lack of a supreme authority? Is everyone to make his or her own personal decision as to which Sha’ariah authority to follow? Are there mitigating circumstances applicable when living in a non-Islamic state? What about those who reside in an Islamic state that purports to apply Sha’ariah law; but, nevertheless permits foreign banks to make loans on interest and its own banks to do so, directly or indirectly, as discussed below? Moreover, which of the conflicting views is right? Absent a supreme Islamic authority recognized by most Moslems, does any Islamic state have the right to decide on its own?

Notwithstanding all the clamor about prohibited Riba and the pedantic distinctions between “interest bearing” instruments vs. “interest based” interments, the reality is that interest or its equivalent is being charged by all manner of banks or other lenders. This includes loans or its equivalent by Moslems to other Moslems. Indeed this has been the case both before Islam, after the inception of Islam and to date.

Is everyone just wrong or is there another interpretation of the Koran? Are there views espoused by religious authorities and scholars that can help explain these practices?

This article suggests that not everyone who charges or pays interest or its equivalent is wrong. But, the fact is many disagree with this proposition. Furthermore, as a practical matter, many Moslems can and do vote with their feet on the issue. Thus, as noted below, many Moslems have bank accounts. Many also borrow from banks using traditional interest bearing loan documents (and not Sha’ariah compliant forms,) because it costs less. In line with the foregoing, HSBC has reportedly closed its Sha’ariah compliant mortgage lending department in London. Consider, why should HSBC or any other bank offer something more expensive and complicated than a traditional mortgage loan when there is no genuine demand for the product. It would appear that Moslem borrowers rightly prefer the simplicity and lower cost of a traditional bank mortgage loan product. They also apparently want to earn interest on their insured bank deposits.

Is right to prohibit these beneficial financial products to Moslems? Is it better to offer Moslems only non-competitive financial products, that are at rates and costs less favorable than prevailing market terms? Is it fair to require Moslems to do so, all in the name of an interpretation of the Koran that may not be justified or appropriate? What about the relevant scholarly views and Fatwas issued by noted Islamic authorities that purport to permit the same, as discussed below; are they just to be ignored?

The answer is not clear. Thus, as discussed below, there appears to be no accepted definition of the word Riba, or of the rules governing the application of the prohibition against Riba, in practice. Instead there are conflicting views of the sort described below and practices accepted by some, but not all, of Islam.

 

ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM RIBA

The Koran itself does not define the word Riba. Thus, although the Koran and the Sunnah use the term Riba, there is no explanation provided as to the meaning of the term. This includes the actual proscription set forth in the Koran itself[5]. While there is an example set forth in the Koran of prohibited Riba[6], there is nevertheless no actual definition provided in that text as well. This is similarly the case in the other verses[7] in the text of the Koran where the term Riba is used. in the Koran. Sha’ariah scholars and authorities over the years have grappled with the meaning of the term Riba and the rules applicable to the prohibition against Riba.

The text of the Koranic prohibition, noted above, set forth in Chapter 2, verse 275 of the Koran, is enlightening. It states that “Bay[8] is permitted and “Riba” is prohibited. What is Riba and what is the difference between Bay (trade) and Riba is not described. Thus, for example, (much like under the Halacha[9],) selling a note at a discount to achieve a given interest like yield is likely considered trade not Riba. On the other hand, accomplishing the same result directly by fixing a rate of interest in the note (to achieve the same yield) is generally reported to be prohibited, as Riba.

The example of prohibited Riba described in Chapter 3, verse 130 of the Koran can fairly be used to elucidate at least one meaning of the term Riba. The example given is of a lender who initially purports to make an interest free loan to a borrower. The borrower is unable to pay off the loan upon maturity. In order to obtain an extension, the lender charges the borrower double or quadruple the loan principal amount, as an extension fee. This is prohibited Riba according to the express provisions of the Koran. This is certainly an excessive and usurious rate of return. As discussed below, some suggest that hence, the term Riba, as opposed to the term “fa’eda” which means “interest” in Arabic, as noted below.

Timur Kuran derived the term Riba from the root “Rib”[10]. He goes on the state that the meaning of the term Rib is precisely the construct set forth in Verse 130 of the Koran noted above.

The Sunnah[11]also set forth an example of wrongful Riba[12]. Indeed, some scholars[13] link the term Riba only to the specific example given in the Sunnah of six particular commodity for commodity type transactions[14] and not any others. Thus, gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, dates for dates, salt for salt and barley for barley transactions are expressly provided for in the Haddith. These items represent stored value in ancient times. Gold and silver both have intrinsic value. The other listed commodities can be dried and stored over time. In effect, they can be used (like gold and silver) to store value over time.

Under, this view, a loan of paper money (or trading in fiat currencies, as opposed to specie,) may not be covered by the prohibition against Riba. It is not one of the commodities expressly listed in the Haddith. Moreover, since paper currency is subject to depreciation against other currencies and inflation, it would appear that under this view, it is permitted to provide for inflation protection as well as depreciation against other currencies[15].  It is suggested that this view of paper money may be restated as, in effect, permitting the sale of credit (i.e.: a loan of paper money on interest), as a function of trade. There may be support for this proposition in the Malaysian Islamic Banking Law, which permits trade in debt (bay al-dayn)[16]

Sir Sayid Ahmad Kahn[17] suggests that the typical bank loan to a business (or even to an individual) does not exhibit the exploitive possibilities of a rich man lending to a poor man for consumption purposes[18], as contemplated by the Koran. Thus, the  Koranic prohibition is not applicable to the typical bank mortgage loan context, for the purpose of purchasing a house or investment property. Consider, the lender is typically not an individual, but rather a legal person. The borrower is not typically a poor person borrowing to eat; but rather someone looking to make an investment in a home, rather than renting, or in an income producing property, as a trade or business. Consider also the economic context where these mortgage loans generally occur. It is in a modern commercial economy, where money is the source of wealth. In addition, the rates of interest charged for use of the money are not excessive. Indeed, they are likely among the lowest rates charged to consumers in history.

Mahmoud Abu–Said[19], an eminent Sha’ariah authority, ruled that a market rate of interest is not Riba (or excessive interest).

In the 1930’s a Syrian Sha’ariah Scholar, Maroufal-Danalibi, asserted that the Koran only prohibited Riba with respect to consumption loans and not investment loans[20].

The Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Muhammed Sayid Tantawi[21], asserted that interest may be charged with respect to government bonds.  He also noted that the Koran does not define the term Riba beyond contrasting it with Zakat[22] and Bay (trade). The only genuine example of Riba provided in the Koran, is that doubling or quadrupling of the principal amount of a loan, as an extension fee[23].

Some of the Sha’ariah authorities suggest that the lack of specificity in the Koran with respect to the meaning of the term Riba and it application was intentional[24]. In this regard, Dr. El-Gamal quotes Mohammad Taqui Usami[25] as follows:

“It must be understood that when we claim that Islam has a satisfactory solution for every problem emerging in any situation in all times to come, we do not mean the Holy Qur’an or the Sunnah…or rulings of Islamic scholars provide a specific answer to each and every minute detail of our socio-economic life. What we mean is that the Holy Qur’an and the Holy Sunnah…have laid down broad principles in the light of which the scholars of every time have deduced specific answers to the new situation arising in their age…”

The key according to some is to analyze the actual means by which Riba was charged at the time and understand that this is what Mohammed sought to prohibit. They go on to say that logic[26] can then be used to discern other analogous circumstances where the prohibition should be applied. This is a slippery slope for a number of reasons. First and foremost, there is no assurance, absent divine inspiration, that the positions asserted based on human logic alone are correct. Indeed many positions can be rationalized in the abstract. Hence the existence of many conflicting positions. Secondly, as Dr. El-Gamal suggests, can something good, like the lower cost of an “interest bearing” financial product, be prohibited in favor of a higher effective rate of interest attributable to an analogous “interest based” product?  Human logic can lead to the contrivance of devices that may be inherently flawed. After all, as Dr. El-Gamal[27] suggests, this incoherence is at once apparent and should be viewed as something wrong.

This can be analyzed on a number of levels. Thus, how could the Sha’ariah dictate that debtors be prejudiced with higher costs than would otherwise be the case (i.e.: when using an “interest based” Sha’ariah compliant financial product as compared to an ordinary “interest bearing” product compliant with capital markets standards). The Sha’ariah, Dr. El-Gamal notes, was intended to benefit debtors not prejudice them. How, therefore, can “interest based” products, employing complex synthetic or derivative financing structures and techniques (that are interest by another name) be permitted and lower cost “interest bearing” products be prohibited?

It would appear that, according to some, if the term “interest” is used, then it is generally prohibited. On the other hand, if an algorithmic or derivative formulaic structure is used that is wholly based on interest (which yields, in effect, a rate of interest), then that structure is permitted. Consider the structures and documents described below which are viewed by many as Sha’ariah compliant. Is it any wonder that some view these structures as mere artifice; nothing more than interest by another name.

Before discussing the details of these Sha’ariah compliant structures, it is important to understand the historical and legal context, including in terms of prior views on just what is Riba and how the prohibition against Riba is applied in practice.

As noted above, many Sha’ariah scholars use Fiqh (jurisprudence or logic) to decide a particular issue that is not expressly provided for in the Koran and Sunnah. These views are sometimes expressed in Fatwas.

Consider how the term Riba was defined by Abdullah Yosuf Ali[28], in his authoritative English translation of the Koran. He defines the term Riba as usury (i.e.: excessive interest) not ordinary interest[29]. He explains that only undue profit in the specific commodities listed in the Koran is prohibited[30]. He excludes economic credit and modern banking and finance from the purview of the term Riba.

M. Siddieg Noorzay[31] asks if Riba means interest per se, then therefore, it must be $0. On the other hand, he posits that a positive rate of return should be permissible, as long as it is not usurious. He goes on to cite Yusuf Ali as noted above, for the proposition that Riba means usurious interest; not ordinary interest.

Some, as noted above, have defined Riba as compound interest[32], as opposed to ordinary interest. Indeed, as noted above, the term in Arabic for interest is “fa’eda”, not Riba.

Notwithstanding all the authorities cited above, some Sha’ariah scholars still equate the term Riba with interest and prohibit it.  I can’t help but wonder if they personally have bank accounts and credit cards. Be that as it may, as discussed herein, actual practice by many good Moslems can vary from these pronouncements[33].


[1] Loosely defined as the way or the path. It appears to be similar in meaning to the term Halacha, which may also be loosely defined as the path or the way.

[2] A book attributed to Mohamed that is said to be authored with prophetic inspiration.

[3] The Sunnah are a collection of reports by others of the (i) sayings of Mohamed (“Hadith”) and (ii) actions of Mohamed.

[4] A scholarly institution of authority and position within the Egyptian governmental and religious establishment of Egypt

[5] Chapter 2, verse 275. “Trade is just like usury; whereas Allah permits trading and forbids usury.”

[6] Chapter 3, verse 130, which provides that should not consume Riba  in the context of charging double or quadruple the loan amount upon maturity of the loan as a fee for an extension..

[7]  Chapter 2, verse 76; Chapter 2, verses 278-9; Chapter 30, verse 39.

[8] trade

[9] See discussion of T-bill vs. T-Bond in Section I above.

[10] In his article, The Logic of Financial Westernization in the Middle East (2004) at pages 2-3.

[11] In this case in a Haddith.

[12] ie: double or quadruple the principal amount as the cost for an extension beyond the original maturity date. (See Koran Section 3:130. Which speaks about Riba  in terms of doubling or quadrupling the amount loaned.

[13] Infra footnotes 167 and 196.

[14] Sahih Bukhar Volume 3, Book 34, #344.

[15] The Hanafi and Hanbali Schools of thought regarded fiat currency (as opposed to specie) as something not expressly covered by the 6 commodities listed in the Hadith described above..

[16] Infra footnote 176 at page 114.

[17]  A Sha’ariah authority in 19th century India

[18].  Kahn discussed the concept of Riba (usury) vs. ordinary interest and asserted that the Koranic prohibition against Riba applied to the poor borrowing for necessities and not commercial ventures. (cited at page 10 in article by Dr Farooq noted in footnote 171 below.)

[19] Author of Contemporary Economic Issues: Usury and Interest (1986). See also Abdul Aziz, Islamic Corporate Finance: A Tool for Economic Development of Moslem Countries and Dr Mohammed Omar Farooq, The Riba-Interest Equation and Islam: Reexamination of the Traditional Arguments (2005).

[20] Islamic Laws of Riba (Interest) and Their Economic Implications in the International by M. Siddieg Noorzay in the Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 14, No.1 (1982) at page 3.

[21] In a Fatwa in1989.

[22] Charity

[23] Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return (Kluwer Law International, the Hague-1998) by Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes III, at page 72.

[24] See  “Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, by Dr. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, in the Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 27, Issue 1(2003), at pages 116-117.

[25] Ibid ,as quoted by Dr. El-Gamal from Usami’s  An Introduction to Islamic Finance (1988) at page 237.

[26] “Fiqh “, sometimes defined as jurisprudence

[27] Supra footnote 176. See also the Incoherence of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in the Age of Financial Engineering, by Mahmoud El-Gamal, Rice University (May-2007).

[28] A 20th century translator of the Koran into English

[29] As noted above, the term for interest in Arabic is “fa’eda”.

[30] Infra,  footnote 167.

[31] Islamic Laws of Riba (Interest) and Their Economic Implications in the International by M.  Siddieg Noorzay in the Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 14, No.1 (1982) at page 3.  Similarly, Egyptian legal jurist Al-Sanhuri in the 1940’s who asserted Riba is interest on interest, as noted in The Riba-Interest Equation and Islam: Reexamination of the Traditional Arguments by Dr Mohammed Omar Farooq (2005).

[32] Vogel and Hayes at page 46

[33] Supra footnote 179.

Heter Iska Need Not be Signed Under Halacha | IRR Part IX

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

WHY THE HETER ISKA NEED NOT (AND UNDER US LAW AND PRACTICE SHOULD NOT) BE SIGNED BY PARTIES UNDER THE HALACHA

The concept of a “Shtar”[1] under Halachah is to be distinguished from a contract under New York law.  A contract is a legally binding agreement entered into by the parties thereto where there are mutual expressions of obligation or other consideration in support of the agreement between the parties.  A Shtar, on the other hand, is not  an agreement.[2]  It therefore need not necessarily be signed by the parties.  It does not require consideration.  Indeed, classically it is signed by two witnesses; not the parties.  A Shtar  is an attestation by the two witnesses as to the existence of an agreement and the terms thereof.  The actual agreement between the parties is accomplished by way of a formal act of “Kinyan.”[3]  There are various types of Kinyanim,[4] all of which are intended to symbolize the effectuation of a transaction between the parties.  Classically, under the Halacha, there is no concept of an agreement that can be enforced.  There are only completed transactions.

Thus, a Heter Iska may be properly entered into under Jewish law as described above, but nevertheless not be enforceable as a contract under US law.  On the most basic level, if the parties themselves do not sign and deliver the Heter Iska in accordance with the formalities required under US law then the document does not constitute an enforceable contract under US law.  There may or may not be an enforceable oral agreement depending on the circumstances.  However, a written agreement must be signed by the party charged in order to be binding.  By following this kind of a procedure, (i.e., of complying with Halachah, with witnesses and not the parties executing and delivering the Heter Iska so as not to become a binding written agreement under US law), in effect, the requirements of the Halacha can be complied with, but not US law.  A situation can thereby be avoided which causes the Halacha or US law to be dishonored because of the unfortunate tactics practiced by some borrowers to avoid their obligations.

Given all of the potential issues associated with trying to enforce a document promulgated wholly under Halacha and never intended to be consistent with US law or any other law, it is no wonder that issues of the sort described above have cropped up, from time to time.  This also helps explain why certain banks have adopted the practice of displaying a Heter Iska on the wall, as opposed to signing an individual Heter Iska.  They do not wish to take the risk that the Heter Iska document will be enforced in a manner that was never intended This is because it is virtually impossible to satisfy the evidentiary requirements that are a precondition to the debtor asserting a defense of no profits under the Heter Iska.  This kind of a nuanced tradition has been developed over the centuries.  A secular court, relying on outside religious experts (who are often in dispute) cannot be expected properly to apply the Halacha as intended.  The reliance by secular courts on outside religious experts to explain the intricate details of the Halacha is just not appropriate.  There may also be constitutional infirmities, as discussed below.  The proper forum for enforcing Halacha is a Bet Din, comprised of Halachic expert judges who are well versed in the nuances of this arcane area of law and practice.

    1. II.              THE SHA’ARIAH- SOURCES OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST RIBA.

The Sha’ariah[5] is not a monolithic legal code. The Koran[6] and the Sunnah[7] (upon which the Sha’ariah is said to be derived,) are also not a legal code. Instead of containing precise answers to questions of religious law, they set forth broad guidelines.

In the period since the Koran, Islam did not experience a phase of codification in the development of the Sha’ariah of the sort experienced by the Halacha. There is no Sha’ariah equivalent to the encyclopedic work represented by the Talmud. There are also no codes of law like that compiled by Maimonides or represented by the TUR or Shulchan Aruch.

There is also no comparable body of legislated laws or common law to that in effect in the US. The US has federal, state and local laws that have been legislated and are binding on its citizens. The US also has a body of common law, with established legal precedents, that can be relied upon in courts or other proceedings. Neither of these hallmarks of the US legal system exist in Islam. While, some Sha’ariah scholars have sought to establish some sort of consensus (known as “Ijma”), this has not necessarily been successful in practice. It does not appear that such scholarly positions have actually been accepted as binding by most who profess to be members of the Islamic faith.

There is also no supreme authority that can determine questions of law like the Supreme Court of the US. In this regard, both the Sha’ariah and Halacha suffer from this same disability in modern times. Hence, the many conflicting views of greater or lesser authority or acceptance, that remain unresolved.

The Sha’ariah might fairly be described as a collection of views over the years, from a variety of sources. As noted above, many of them are in conflict. The sources of the views expressed include those of recognized legal authorities such as the Mufti of a particular Islamic state, as well as, those reputable scholars. It also includes the views of self-professed authorities and spokesmen of differing backgrounds, education and authority. All claim to derive their views from the Koran or the Sunnah. However, sometimes the Koranic text quoted in support of a particular position may not be so clear. As noted below, these claims may or may not survive genuine scholarly scrutiny. Indeed, as noted below, self-appointed spokesmen for Islam, such as Osama Bin Laden, apparently can successfully challenge the views of such leading legal authorities as the Mufti of Egypt’s Al Azhar Institute[8]. This is often done in the name of advancing a particular brand of Islam. There is often not even the veneer of a legal or scholarly approach to these pronouncements. As discussed below, just because someone says that the Koran says so doesn’t make it so. Fortunately, extremists, no matter how strident, cannot actually legislate and control how most members of Islam act in practice. Nevertheless, the extremists have caused a great deal of conflict, discussion and debate by established legal authorities.

In this regard it should be noted, that there is a dispute among recognized Sha’ariah authorities as to the very meaning of the term Riba and its application. Yet, there is no supreme authority, recognized by most of Islam that is capable of deciding the matter.

What is a Moslem in a non-Islamic state to do? How is a determination to be made given the lack of a supreme authority? Is everyone to make his or her own personal decision as to which Sha’ariah authority to follow? Are there mitigating circumstances applicable when living in a non-Islamic state? What about those who reside in an Islamic state that purports to apply Sha’ariah law; but, nevertheless permits foreign banks to make loans on interest and its own banks to do so, directly or indirectly, as discussed below? Moreover, which of the conflicting views is right? Absent a supreme Islamic authority recognized by most Moslems, does any Islamic state have the right to decide on its own?

Notwithstanding all the clamor about prohibited Riba and the pedantic distinctions between “interest bearing” instruments vs. “interest based” interments, the reality is that interest or its equivalent is being charged by all manner of banks or other lenders. This includes loans or its equivalent by Moslems to other Moslems. Indeed this has been the case both before Islam, after the inception of Islam and to date.

Is everyone just wrong or is there another interpretation of the Koran? Are there views espoused by religious authorities and scholars that can help explain these practices?

This article suggests that not everyone who charges or pays interest or its equivalent is wrong. But, the fact is many disagree with this proposition. Furthermore, as a practical matter, many Moslems can and do vote with their feet on the issue. Thus, as noted below, many Moslems have bank accounts. Many also borrow from banks using traditional interest bearing loan documents (and not Sha’ariah compliant forms,) because it costs less. In line with the foregoing, HSBC has reportedly closed its Sha’ariah compliant mortgage lending department in London. Consider, why should HSBC or any other bank offer something more expensive and complicated than a traditional mortgage loan when there is no genuine demand for the product. It would appear that Moslem borrowers rightly prefer the simplicity and lower cost of a traditional bank mortgage loan product. They also apparently want to earn interest on their insured bank deposits.

Is right to prohibit these beneficial financial products to Moslems? Is it better to offer Moslems only non-competitive financial products, that are at rates and costs less favorable than prevailing market terms? Is it fair to require Moslems to do so, all in the name of an interpretation of the Koran that may not be justified or appropriate? What about the relevant scholarly views and Fatwas issued by noted Islamic authorities that purport to permit the same, as discussed below; are they just to be ignored?

The answer is not clear. Thus, as discussed below, there appears to be no accepted definition of the word Riba, or of the rules governing the application of the prohibition against Riba, in practice. Instead there are conflicting views of the sort described below and practices accepted by some, but not all, of Islam.


[1]A written document that is signed by witnesses who, in effect, testify as to transaction described in the document.

[2] Traditionally, the Halacha does not recognize the common law concept of an executory agreement (i.e., a contractual obligation to sell or buy property).  Rather, under the Halacha, there are only completed transfers of property effectuated by a Kinyan.  If, however, the buyer does not pay for the property, then the Halacha recognizes that there are various rights and/or remedies, including rescission (see Shulchan Aruch-Yoreh Deah 236:6).  In addition, the Halacha also deems the right to payment of the purchase price as a debt of the buyer, which is secured by a floating lien on the property purchased, as well as on the buyer’s other property.  See Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia at page 49a and also Bava Metzia: 47b (regarding a vendor claim of fraud), as well as, Bava Metzia: 44a (regarding “Mi Shepara”).  See also Bava Metzia: 49a (absent a formal Kinyan, it is all just words).  Moreover, see Bava Batra at page 3a and Shulchan Aruch-Choshen Mishpat 198:1-5.  For a fuller discussion of the matter, see Understanding Rights in Context; Freedom Contract?  A Comparison of the Various Jewish and American Traditions and Michael J. Broyde and Steven S. Wiener (2010); The Metaphysis of Property Interests in Jewish Law, by J. David Bleich (2010); and when Religious Practices become Legal Obligations; Extending the Foreign Compulsion Defense by Michael A. Helfand (Journal of Law and Religion Vol. 23: page 101-2008).

[3] A symbolic method of effectuating a transfer of property.  In modern times, this includes a Kinyan known as “Situmta”.  Rashi describes the origin of the term “Situmta” as the mark made by wine merchants on their barrels to identify them as having been sold (see Rashi on Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia: 74a).  Tosafot (Bava Metzia 66a) explains that Situmta embodies a class of actions, which are recognized by custom as methods of accomplishing a transaction.  This, even though they are not recognized as Kinyanim in the Torah.  Aaron Levine (in The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics) defines Situmta as a mode of acquisition in practice in a particular place.  He concludes that by employing the law of Situmta, Halachic authorities have, in effect, recognized halachically, prevailing modes of acquisition (despite the fact that they are not sourced in the Talmud).  I discussed the matter of modern contract law and practice under the common law with Menachem Elon. I noted to him that there was no such thing as an enforceable executory contract in the Talmud.  Rather, there were only executed transactions (i.e., transfers by way of Kinyan) and, in effect, a debt for the purchase price.  He responded that as a matter of custom (“minhag”) contracts were recognized.  He went on to say the basis of the applicable minhag was “diamonds”.  I responded that diamonds were consignment arrangements not a contract for the sale and purchase of real estate.  He smiled and said that it was nevertheless enforceable as a matter of custom (minhag).

[4] Plural of Kinyan.

[5] Loosely defined as the way or the path. It appears to be similar in meaning to the term Halacha, which may also be loosely defined as the path or the way.

[6] A book attributed to Mohamed that is said to be authored with prophetic inspiration.

[7] The Sunnah are a collection of reports by others of the (i) sayings of Mohamed (“Hadith”) and (ii) actions of Mohamed.

[8] A scholarly institution of authority and position within the Egyptian governmental and religious establishment of Egypt

Heter Iska & U.S. Courts | IRR Part VIII

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

HETER ISKA AND THE US COURTS

The nature and enforceability of a Heter Iska has been the subject of a number of NY court decisions with varying consequences.  This is problematical in a number of respects.  Of primary concern is the fact that these kinds of anomalous and unpredictable results are the bane of lenders and the capital markets.  Furthermore, as shown below, the treatment of a Heter Iska by a US court may be wholly inconsistent with how the very same document would likely be treated under the Halacha.

To better understand the basis for these concerns, it is important to analyze a number of the seminal decisions under New York law in this area, which affected the way banks structure loans involving a Heter Iska.

One of the more important cases in this area of law is IDB v. Weiss & Wolf,[1] a 1985 NY State Supreme Court[2] decision.  In that case, the Court held that a triable issue existed as to whether a Heter Iska defense was available to the borrower.  As a result of this decision, banks no longer typically sign an individual Heter Iska.  Instead, there is the Heter Iska on the wall, as it were.[3]  Its presence on the wall, instead of in an individual loan file, says much about how serious an issue (i.e., the existence of a Heter Iska signed by the lender and borrower) was presented by the decision in the IDB case.  Ever since then the banks have correctly balked at signing a Heter Iska.  While the case is not reported to have gone to final judgment (presumably it settled), it did establish a precedent in practice.  Thus, given that a properly drawn and executed Heter Iska could be enforced by the courts, banks therefore avoided doing so.  The court’s finding that a triable issue existed was sufficient to case a chilling effect on entering into a Heter Iska on an individual basis.  No bank wants to take the chance of having a borrower interpose a defense, which survives a motion for summary judgment, let alone conceivably lose any portion of the principal amount of the loan.

In 1986, the NY Supreme Court faced another case involving a Heter Iska in Bank Leumi Trust Company of New York v. Morris Spitzer.[4]  In that case, the Court found that Spitzer did not know about the Bank’s Heter Iska, even though it was displayed on the wall, until well after the loan was made.  The Court in the Leumi case granted summary judgment for the benefit of the bank (unlike in the IDB case).  This is because, among other things, the borrower did not rely on the Heter Iska when he entered into the loan.  Indeed, the borrower didn’t even have a copy of the Heter Iska.  Moreover, the US Bank Leumi subsidiary of the Israeli parent bank did not ratify or sign the Israeli parent’s Heter Iska document.  Neither did the borrower (Spitzer) sign a Heter Iska.  The Court found that the bank had never executed and delivered the Heter Iska to the borrower, even though there was a form that was hung on the wall.  On the other hand, the Court found there was a promissory note, which was signed and delivered by the borrower under US law.  The Court weighed this against an unsigned Heter Iska, which the borrower was not even aware of and the bank had disavowed.  The Court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the bank.  It found that a loan transaction existed, not a Heter Iska relationship.

There have been a number of other unique and interesting cases involving a Heter Iska.  In Bollag v. Dresdner,[5] a civil court case in 1985, the lender sought to use a Heter Iska as a sword instead of a shield.  Thus, the lender sought to collect a usurious rate of interest (in excess of 24% per annum) arguing that the arrangement was truly a profit sharing deal.  The civil court held that substance controlled over form.  It found that notwithstanding the Heter Iska, the arrangement was in fact a loan, which was subject to state usury laws.  The prohibition against usury (excessive interest) could not be avoided by styling the loan as a Heter Iska relationship.

In Heimbinder v. Berkowitz,[6] the lender tried to use the Heter Iska document to assert  personal liability against the shareholder in the corporate borrower, where none existed under US law.  In that case, the borrower was a corporation, notwithstanding that the Heter Iska document was signed by the individual principals.  The court found that the Heter Iska could not change a corporate loan into a personal loan.[7]

Arnav Industries, Inc. v. Westside Realty Associates, et al[8] involved a mortgagee, which sought to foreclose on its mortgage.  The lower court denied summary judgment.  It focused on the insertion of a Hebrew phrase in the mortgage, to wit: “al pi Heter Iska” (in accordance with a Heter Iska)[9] above the signature on the mortgage note and found that there was an issue of fact as to whether it created a partnership agreement between the lender and borrower.  The Appellate Division disagreed and reversed the lower court decision.  It held that the language could not be used by the borrower to vary the terms of the mortgage note.  Among other things, there was no actual Heter Iska signed by the parties.  The note also contained a provision to the effect that nothing contained therein was intended to create a joint venture or partnership.

The Appellate Division in Arnav also cited its own decision in Barclay Commerce Corp. v. Finkelstein.[10]  In the Barclay case, the Appellate Division noted that the Heter Iska constituted “merely a compliance in form…with Hebraic Law.”[11]  It held a partnership is not created thereby and the issue is devoid of merit.  A similar decision was made by the Federal District Court for Massachusetts in Edelkind, et al v. Fairmont Funding, Ltd., et al.[12]

The Appellate Division in LZG Realty LLC, et  al v. HDW, et  al[13] also dealt with an action for foreclosure of a mortgage.  The defendant borrower failed to raise the matter of a Heter Iska and the binding rabbinical arbitration clause thereunder until 1½ years into the matter.  The court held that it was too late to raise the issue at that point in the case.  The court therefore did not reach the underlying issue of the Heter Iska in the case.

In Koenig v. Middlebury Land Associates, LLC, et al,[14] the court dealt with a Heter Iska that had a rabbinical arbitration clause.  The court found, however, that it was not a binding arbitration clause.

The US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York In Re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., Debtor (and In Re David Schick et al Debtors)[15]  ruled that the Heter Iska could not be used as a means to collect a usurious rate of interest of 27% interest per annum.

A recent noteworthy lower court opinion in the NY Supreme Court of Nassau County (dated January 11, 2012) involved the foreclosure of a mortgage.  The name of the case is VNB New York Corp v. 47 Lynbrook LLC, et al (Index # 018467/2010).  In case the mortgage made reference to the fact that to ensure compliance with Jewish law, the Bank has entered into a Heter Iska.  The defendants sought to amend their answer to interpose a defense against a deficiency judgment based on the Heter Iska.  The court noted that the note and mortgage made it clear that applicable civil law (i.e., NY law) was to govern.  Accordingly, the court found that the existence of the Heter Iska did not alter the clear intent of the parties that NY law governs the enforcement of the mortgage documents.  The Heter Iska was not ground for overturning the foreclosure judgment nor could the defendants defend against a corresponding deficiency judgment based thereon.


[1] NY State Supreme Court-1984, NYLJ 2/4/85 at page 14.

[2] The court of original jurisdiction in New York. This as distinguished from the US Supreme Court, the highest court of the land. The highest court in New York State is the Court of Appeals.

[3] It is said that when Rav Moshe Feinstein visited an American-Israeli bank, he noticed that there was a framed Heter Iska on the wall.  He is reputed to have said “Kiknah de Heter Iska oif de Vant” (see the Heter Iska on the Wall).

[4] Unreported decision dated 9/18/86 by Judge Leonard N. Cohen in NY Supreme Court New York County under Index # 017734/1986.

[5] 130 Misc.2nd 221, 495 NYS2nd 560 (NY Civ. Ct. Kings County-1985).

[6] 175 Misc.2nd 808, 670 NYS2nd 301 (S. Ct. Kings County-1998).

[8] 180 AD2d 463, 579 NYS2d 382 (App Div 1rst Dept.-1992).

[9] An example of this kind of a text may be viewed online at sec.edgar-online.com regarding Allou 10-k annual report (dated 6/30/97)- Exhibit B: Section 1 (iii). The Exhibit is an Amendment to the Guaranty, which adds the following provision to Section 15 of the Guaranty: “Heter Iska: This Guaranty is being provided to BLT in accordance with BLT’s Heter Iska.” BLT is a reference to Bank Leumi Trust Company of NY.

[10] 11 AD2nd 325, 205 NYS2nd 551 (App Div 1rst Dept-1960). See also Leibovic v. Rawicki 64 Misc2nd 858, 316 NYS2nd 181 (NY Sup-App Term-1969).

[11] Ibid at page 328

[12] 539 F. Supp. 2d 449 (2007)

[13] 71 AD3rd 642 (App Div-Second Dept.-2010)

[14] 2008 Conn. Super. Lexis 1816 (July 23,2008)

[15] 245 B.R. 460 (2000) aff’d 282 F3rd 185 (2d Cir. NY-2002)

Evolution of Heter Iska Structure | IRR Part VI

Interest, Ribit and Riba: Must These Disparate Legal Concepts Be Integrated or Is a More Nuanced Approach Appropriate for the Global Financial Community?

 

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HETER ISKA STRUCTURE

The Maharam[1] (approximately 400 years ago) reported a number of amendments[2] to the form Heter Iska.  The primary change involved the stipulation noted above that only the Rabbi[3] and Chazan[4] could testify on the matter of the debtor’s worldwide income from any source.  This seemed to be too contrived and so the Maharam substituted having two kosher witnesses.[5]  However, proof was still required that the managing member did not profit or earn income from any source anywhere in the world.[6]  This was still virtually impossible to satisfy.  After all, how could anyone (of their own personal knowledge) actually know an individual so well as to testify that the individual made no money at all.  The standard is actual knowledge, not circumstantial evidence.  Moreover, only two kosher witnesses with actual knowledge are acceptable.  The Maharam also provides for a “kenas” (a penal amount as liquidated damages) that is due in lieu of the debtor taking an oath.  This then is another means of providing for a return on investment.  The fee can be fixed by formula to mimic interest.

The Shoal u’Mayshiv[7] considered the issue of whether a Heter Iska could properly be used to cover what appears to be a personal loan.  Thus, a teacher wished to obtain funds in order to make a wedding for his daughter and asked whether a Heter Iska mechanism could be employed, in effect, to borrow the funds needed and repay them with what amounts to interest.  The Shoal u’Mayshiv determined that the Heter Iska structure could also be used in this case.  He reasoned that if the teacher could not borrow the funds needed to make a wedding, the teacher would necessarily have to forfeit his job in order to seek charitable donations for this purpose.  He, therefore, concluded that the teacher’s wages could be treated as a source of income or profit under the Heter Iska structure.  The Shoal u’Mayshiv deemed the teacher’s compensation retained as a result of continuing to work as the equivalent of Heter Iska profit.  This is so even though the funds loaned were not invested in a business venture to earn a profit.  The wages earned by the teacher were for work done and were not directly derived from the principal amount of the loan.

The Maharam[8] applied the Heter Iska exception to a mortgage loan against a personal residence.[9]  This was so notwithstanding that the funds were used by the borrower personally to buy a personal residence.  The mortgage loan (covered by the Heter Iska) was against a personal residence; not a pledge of business assets as was originally contemplated when the Heter Iska structure was initiated, as noted above.

The Mabit[10] further developed the form Heter Iska.  He held that there may be various duties and obligations, which the debtor undertakes under the Heter Iska.  The exception though was there could not be an explicit promise that there would only be profits.

There are various forms of Heter Iska in use today.  In general though, they are based on the investment trust funds conceptual arrangement derived from the Talmudic discussion reported in Tractate  Bava Kama,[11] as noted above and crystallized in practice by such halachic authorities as the Terumat Hadeshen and Mabit.  They all have in common the concept of having threshold conditions, which are virtually impossible to fulfill.

This tradition has been further refined over time by extending it to the threshold procedural requirements of Bet Din, as well.  The effect is to assure that the Heter Iska cannot be improperly used to defeat the implicit obligation of the borrower to repay the loan together with what amounts to interest.

Rav Asher Weiss[12] in his discussion of Heter Iska described a modern iteration of the form, which contains a number of very interesting provisions.  The form is premised on kulo pikadon (all investment).  Among the duties set forth in the Heter Iska is the requirement that there be an accounting of worldwide income which is attested to by an oath every month (i.e., from the very inception of the transaction and in good times and bad).  If this condition is not met, then a fixed rate of return must be paid in lieu of a profit share in accordance with a formula agreed to by the parties.  This tracks along the precedent established by the Mabit (which is based on the Talmudic discussion in Bava Kama[13] as described above).

Rabbi Asher Weis also noted that there are threshold procedural requirements of Bet Din that apply to this kind of a case.  Thus, an oath would not be administered to the borrower in support of his claim of no profits, unless the debtor first demonstrated to the Bet Din satisfaction of the pre-conditions to bringing such a claim.  This includes the monthly accounting (of debtor’s worldwide income from any source) requirement that itself had to be sworn to by two competent witnesses each and every month from the inception of the loan and until payment in full with interest.  If this burden was not satisfied first, then the oath of the debtor would not be administered and debtor’s claim would fail before it could even be presented.[14]

Rav Blau,[15] a recognized expert in the area of banking transactions, also dealt with an number of knotty issues in connection with formulating a bank form of Heter Iska.

Among the many questions I had occasion to discuss with him was the issue of whether the Heter Iska had to be enforceable under the laws of the jurisdiction were it was executed (i.e., US law).  Thus, if for any reason a Heter Iska might not be enforced under the laws of a particular country, then would that affect the Halachic validity of the Heter Iska.  Rav Blau concluded that so long as the Heter Iska was validly created under the Halacha, it did not matter that the document was not enforceable under other laws.  This was an extremely important consideration in drafting the Heter Iska procedures for the IDB Heter Iska, as noted below.


[1] Rabbi Mendel ben Avigdor of Cracow, a 16th century Halachic authority.

[2] Volume 2, Section 216

[3] Supra Footnote 66.

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Infra footnote 91

[7] A Halachic work by Rabbi Joseph Saul Nathanson, a 19th Century Halachic authority (in Volume 3, Section 170).  Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron (author of the Tshuvat Maharsham), an early 20th century halachic authority (in Volume II, Section 216) agrees with the Shoal U’Mayshiv that a Heter Iska may be used for a personal loan.  Others disagree, including Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe-YDII:62), a leading 20th Century Halachic authority.  See also In re Yosher (Volume I: 108) by Rav Meir Arak, a 20th Century Halachic authority (who holds that the debtor’s salary is not considered profits from a venture for purposes of justifying the applicability of the Heter Iska exception to the prohibition against Ribit; as well as, Ginat Veradim (YD Section 6:4) by Rav Avraham ben Mordechai Ha Levi, a 17th Century Halachic authority; Shulcham Aruch Ha Rav (Hilchot Ribit: 42) by Rav Schneur Zalmin of Liady, an 18th Century Hassidic Master (Lubavich) and Halachic authority (who also authored the Tanya); and the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (Section 66:10) by Rav Sholom Ganzfried, a 19th Century Halachic authority.  Also, see The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics by Aaron Levine (Oxford University Press – 2010).

[8] Volume2, Section 216.

[9] I.e., not an investment property.

[10] Rabbi Moses ben Joseph di Trani, a 16th century Halachic authority, Volume I, section 244.

[11] Page 102a

[12] In oral communication with author.

[13] At page 102a.

[14] We also discussed other possible non-Ribit structures. Of particular interest was the possibility of using a classic bill of exchange kind of construct, where payment was made in another currency. The concept was to use a currency in which there was an implicit inflationary hedge (as the equivalent of an interest factor) when compared to the local currency. This structure was based on a Halachic decision by the Maharsdam (a 16th century Halachic authority)  in response to a question he received on the subject (See  Maharsdam Y.D. Section 176 at page). This kind of an interest analogue was in vogue in the Middle Ages prior to the Protestant Reformation to mimic what would otherwise be prohibited interest. Thus, back-to-back bills of exchange each specifying a sale of currency transaction. These were used to create the equivalent of a built in interest-like return. In essence, the borrower agreed to pay a price in a selected currency at an agreed upon exchange rate to the local currency of the borrower. A corresponding sale by the lender of the currency the other way locked in the profit with no risk to the lender. If the two transactions in currency were integrated then the borrower was, in effect, paying a higher cost in the local currency, thereby generating an artificial, risk free, profit to the lender, in the very same local currency. See Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia pages 44-45. See also The Valuation of Coins in Medieval Jewish Jurisdiction by Daniel A. Schiffman.

[15] A 21st century Halachic expert on banking and lending, in oral communications with the author.  Rav Blau is the author of the Bris Yehuda, a seminal Halachic work of our times on matters of Heter Iska and Ribit. He also helped formulate the Heter Iska format and practices adopted at Israel Discount Bank, while I was Chairman of IDB in the US. See also discussion by Rabbi Blau in Brit Yehuda:40 about Heter Iska Klali (as opposed to an  individually signed one for each loan).